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Drinking Water and Exclusion: A Case
Study from California’s Central Valley
Camille Pannu*
The American West is notorious for its water wars, and
California’s complex water allocation and governance challenges
serve as a bellwether for contemporary water governance across
western states. Policy makers and environmental advocates typically
represent California’s water woes as a regulatory problem—a failure
to balance the needs of growing urban populations with ecological
preservation and agricultural irrigation. These debates, however,
often elide the issue of water deprivation, and they do not adequately
address the concerns of an important constituency: low-income, rural
communities.
This Comment argues that a focus on regulation misses a
fundamental feature of water inequality: the structure and design of
local water districts. Utilizing a case study of California’s Central
Valley to illustrate how these structural barriers operate, I argue that
California’s complex system of local water districts fractures
governance, limits electoral participation, and undermines the
State’s stated environmental, equity, and utilitarian water goals. I
offer suggestions for alternative local water district organization in
order to address the constraints of California’s current water
governance regime.

Copyright © 2012 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a
California nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their
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INTRODUCTION
Three years ago, the neighborhood well ran dry in Fairmead.1 In the wake
of California’s drought, neighboring farms had exhausted the groundwater that
sustained the fifty families in the area.2 As the summer heat climbed to over
110 degrees Fahrenheit, families were desperate for drinking water. Fairmead’s
“mayor”3 cleared out the bed of his pickup truck and drove to the closest city,
looking for a grocery store that would sell him water. Drinking water was
scarce throughout the county, and stores had begun rationing the amount of
water they would sell to individual customers within a given territory. He drove
over three-hundred miles before he could buy enough bottled drinking water

1. Community of Fairmead, Testimony at the Workshop on Rural Advocacy for Policy
Reform, Third National Summit on Equitable Development, Social Justice, and Smart Growth (Mar. 7,
2008) (on file with author). Fairmead is an unincorporated community southwest of Chowchilla,
California, adjacent to California Highway 99.
2. Id.
3. Despite their unincorporated status, the community of Fairmead uses the term “mayor” to
describe their method of self-organization. Community members elect a “mayor,” although not
through a typical general election, but rather, through their neighborhood association.
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for his community.4 The water that lined his truck bed was then rationed to
community members at a quarter-gallon per person per day.5 Fairmead went
without running water for over a week. Its story never made it to the
newspapers; there was no debate before a city council meeting, and there were
no hearings in Sacramento. To the outside world, nothing had happened at all.
Fairmead’s lack of access to residential water is typical of unincorporated
communities throughout California’s Central Valley (“Valley”). Further, the
water issues facing the Valley6 compare to the water challenges facing the
prairie and agricultural lands of other western states. The Valley, like other
rural regions, is geographically vast with swathes of low-density settlement
punctuated by higher-density cities. Within these lower-density settlements,
poverty and unemployment are high, tax bases are limited, and access to
infrastructure varies significantly. Further, the demand for agricultural water
lies in tension with demand for residential water. These structural barriers to
water equality are paralleled throughout other rural regions across the nation,
where lack of access to clean water remains a constant worry for residents.7
As agricultural regions throughout the country—including the West,
Midwest, and South—experience longer and more severe periods of drought,8
4. Community of Fairmead, supra note 1.
5. This amount is less than half of the suggested daily water intake for adult women (the rate is
higher for men). Public health organizations suggest the average adult consume at least 0.52 gallons of
drinking water, or other primarily water-based drink, per day. Water: How Much Should You Drink
Every Day?, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/water/NU00283 (last visited Oct. 25,
2011).
6. The phrases “Central Valley” and “Valley” are used interchangeably throughout this piece to
refer to the agricultural regions encompassed in California’s Sacramento River, San Joaquin River, and
Tulare Lake hydrologic basins. This region fully encompasses Amador, Butte, Calaveras, Colusa, El
Dorado, Glenn, Fresno, Kings, Lake, Madera, Mariposa, Merced, Nevada, Placer, Plumas,
Sacramento, San Joaquin, Shasta, Sierra, Stanislaus, Sutter, Tehama, Tulare, Tuolumne, Yolo, and
Yuba Counties and partially encompasses Alameda, Alpine, Contra Costa, Kern, Lassen, Modoc,
Napa, Siskiyou, and Solano Counties. The “upper Valley” typically refers to the Sacramento River
basin, and the “lower Valley”—or “San Joaquin Valley”—refers to the San Joaquin River and Tulare
Lake basin regions.
7. I use the term “unincorporated” to denote non-urban residents; that is, individuals who
interface with only one layer of general local government (e.g., the county) as opposed to the two
layers of general local government (city and county) that nearly every “urban” or “municipal” resident
enjoys. I use “municipal” to refer to formal, incorporated cities, including cities in urban (e.g., Los
Angeles) and rural (e.g., Fresno) geographies. This typology is set forth in Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474, 483 (1968). A more expansive description is set forth infra Section I.B.
8. Kim Severson & Kirk Johnson, Drought Spreads Pain from Florida to Arizona, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 2011, at A1; see also Dangerously Dry, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/07/11/us/DROUGHT.html (citing a study by the National
Drought Mitigation Center stating that one-fifth of the contiguous United States, from Baltimore,
Maryland, to El Centro, California, faced extreme drought conditions in 2011); Paul Quinlan, Lake
Mead’s Water Level Plunges as 11-Year Drought Lingers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/12/12greenwire-lake-meads-water-level-plunges-as-11-yeardrou-29594.html; Ari Auber, Drought Damages Texas Infrastructure, TEX. TRIB. (Aug. 4, 2011),
http://www.texastribune.org/texas-environmental-news/environmental-problems-and-policies/droughtdamages-texas-infrastructure.
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the issue of access to clean residential water has become increasingly salient.
While rural communities have historically deployed groundwater pumps and
wells to obtain residential water, these water sources often cannot meet the
demand for both irrigation and residential water, nor can they affordably
sanitize well water.9 These twin features—water access and water quality—
determine whether communities will be able to obtain clean water.
Unfortunately for rural agricultural communities in the West, water is scarce,
and its quality is often poor. It is this lack of access to clean residential water
that poses the most significant health and security challenge to rural survival.
Contaminated drinking water imposes dramatic costs on water users, both
in terms of personal health and monetary costs. Despite forty years of statutory
water protection regimes,10 the New York Times reports that over 20 percent of
American water systems failed key provisions of the U.S. Safe Drinking Water
Act11 from 2004 to 2009.12 The majority of these water violations occurred
within small and rural water systems that served fewer than twenty thousand
residents.13 The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
estimates that lack of access to clean water costs over $500 million annually14
and may have much greater long-term consequences in the form of Disability
Adjusted Life Years (DALYs).15
Nonetheless, states often do not measure the public health impacts of
excessive water pollution on individual health, and this measurement gap is
especially wide for nontraditional, small, and rural water systems. Failure to
gather data on the health and development costs of water inequality discourages
policy makers from taking action to address rural communities’ access to safe,
9. For an example of the costs of obtaining reliable and safe drinking water, see Scott Kraft, In
Tiny Seville, Trouble on Tap, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/07/
local/la-me-seville-water-20101107. In the article, a Seville resident explains: “I hear people in
Hollywood talk about helping people in the Third World get clean water. Well, we need help in our
own backyard first . . . . Farming is important. But in the end, we can live without the fruit—not
without water.”
10. Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006); Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42
U.S.C. § 300f (2006).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 300f.
12. Charles Duhigg, Millions in U.S. Drink Contaminated Water, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2009, at A1 (estimating 49 million Americans, or 15.7 percent of the population, drank
illegally contaminated water).
13. Id. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines small water systems as
systems that serve fewer than 3,300 people. Basic Information, Water: Small Systems and Capacity
Development, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/type/drink/pws/smallsystems/
basicinformation.cfm (last visited Oct. 17, 2011). It states that 94 percent of public water systems
qualify as small systems. Id.
14. Press Release, U.S. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC), Waterborne Diseases
Could Cost Over $500 Million Annually in U.S. (July 14, 2010), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2010/r100714.htm.
15. Metrics: Disability-Adjusted Life Year, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (WHO),
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/metrics_daly/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 25,
2011).
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affordable drinking water. Instead, state legislatures focus on higher-profile
water issues, such as determining the allocation of water between urban centers
and farms, or setting the parameters for large water infrastructure projects.
As one of the first states to embrace a decentralized system of state and
local water governance, California’s approach to water policy has served as an
archetype for other western states. Like other western states, California
invested heavily in the development and irrigation of its rural core.16 The
Valley, then, provides an illustrative example of how water governance can be
leveraged to exacerbate or ameliorate water inequality in rural communities.
This Comment examines how the structure of local water districts
undermines California’s interests in protecting the right to clean, safe drinking
water, ensuring environmental protection, and achieving the most beneficial
allocation of its water resources. Using the Valley as a case study for local
water districts in the West, I argue that California’s current models of local
water government are untenable and that property-based voting schemes in
these districts reify a failing system of governance and exacerbate water
inequality for rural residents.
This Comment proceeds by first situating water inequality in the broader
landscape of poverty and resource inequality within the Central Valley. Part II
reviews California’s right to safe, clean drinking water and explores the gap
between this enumerated right and the lived experiences of rural residents. Part
III explains California’s model of water governance, both through state and
local water agencies and districts. I argue that this structure, combined with
anti-democratic governance models, undermines democratic accountability and
the State’s interest in the right to safe, clean drinking water. Finally, I conclude
with suggestions for reorganizing water governance to better achieve the right
to drinking water for rural residents.
I.
UNDERSTANDING WATER INEQUALITY
Water inequality—the lack of access to affordable, safe, clean water—
plays a significant role in economic and human development. While water and
human health are typically discussed in the context of international
development,17 rural U.S. communities often receive much less support for
addressing and financing comparable water poverty challenges.18 The severity
of the water development gap between urban and peri-urban/rural communities
16. NORRIS HUNDLEY, THE GREAT THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, A HISTORY 234–
302 (2d ed. 2001).
17. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME (UNDP), HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2006—BEYOND SCARCITY: POWER, POVERTY AND THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 30–51 (2006).
18. Faqir Singh Bagi, Small Rural Communities’ Quest for Safe Drinking Water, 17 RURAL
AMER. 40 (Fall 2002), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/ruralamerica/ra173/
ra173g.pdf.
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is especially discomfiting in highly developed countries, where human
development indicators for health and sanitation are assumed to evince the
highest standards of technological development and health quality.
Environmentalists have played an important role in defining the para-meters
of water policy in the domestic context,19 and their work typically falls into three
domains: water conservation;20 water quality, contamination, and pollution;21 and
water use.22 This Comment attempts to fill gaps in the last domain, focusing on
how communities receive (or do not receive) a share of clean water holdings.
Using the Central Valley as a case study, this Part describes the human
development constraints in one of the nation’s poorest regions, connects water
inequality with rural poverty in the western United States, and explains why the
Valley serves as a prototypical case study for other rural western regions. It
concludes by explaining how common mechanisms for rural water provision
exacerbate economic and human development concerns.
A. The Contours of Central Valley Poverty
There are myriad human rights concerns in the Valley, but the greatest
threats to the security of unincorporated, rural communities lie at the
intersection of environmental health, racial discrimination, and poverty. In
California, the Valley experiences some of the state’s highest asthma rates,23
19. See CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., 2009 CALIFORNIA COMPREHENSIVE WATER PACKAGE:
SPECIAL SESSION POLICY BILLS AND BOND SUMMARY (2009) [hereinafter SPECIAL SESSION POLICY
BILLS AND BOND SUMMARY]. See also Bettina Boxall, California Legislature Passes State Water
Conservation Bill, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/04/local/mewater4 (emphasizing the coastal urban/agricultural divide); Jennifer Steinhauer, California Water
Overhaul Caps Use, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A16 (same); California Right to Water Bill Vetoed,
CIRCLE OF BLUE (Oct. 21, 2009, 5:10 PM), http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2009/world/
california-right-to-water-bill-vetoed (explaining that the only water bill to address drinking water was
vetoed in support of bond initiatives for surface water).
20. See, e.g., Nathan Baker, Water, Water, Everywhere, and at Last a Drop for Salmon?
NRDC v. Houston Heralds New Prospects Under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act, 29 ENVTL.
L. 607 (1999) (biodiversity and habitat preservation); Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono
Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701 (1995) (same); Nathaniel
H. Clark, Upstream Struggle: California Attempts to Salvage Wild Salmon and Steelhead Trout, 40
MCGEORGE L. REV. 563 (2009) (same); Joshua Harris, A Lasting Proposal for Endangered Bay-Delta
Fish Survival: The Environmental Water Account and the Accumulation of Water Contract Rights in
the Central Valley Project and the State Water Project, 26 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 121
(2002) (same); Ruth Langridge, Confronting Drought: Water Supply Planning and the Establishment
of a Strategic Groundwater Reserve, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 295 (2009) (conservation); Gregory
A. Thomas, Conserving Aquatic Biodiversity: A Critical Comparison of Legal Tools for Augmenting
Streamflows in California, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (1996) (biodiversity and habitat preservation).
21. See, e.g., Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths that Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 20
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 63 (2002) (water quality regulation); Scott M. Rennie, Selenium in San Joaquin
Valley Agricultural Drainage: A Major Toxic Threat to Fish and Wildlife Inadequately Addressed by
the Central Valley Project Improvement Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 303 (1996) (biodiversity and habitat
preservation).
22. See SPECIAL SESSION POLICY BILLS AND BOND SUMMARY, supra note 19.
23. Laura E. Lund, Asthma in Adults in California Counties, 2003, CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH
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diabetes and malnutrition rates,24 rates of pesticide exposure,25 and “blue baby
syndrome” (nitrate poisoning) deaths.26 The lower Valley (San Joaquin Valley)
is among the nation’s poorest regions, outpacing greater Appalachia in poverty,
unemployment, and public assistance usage.27
Table 1: Valley Poverty Indicators Compared to California and the Nation
Poverty Rate28
Unemployment Rate29
Enrolled in Food Stamps30

Valley
19.3%
18.0%
19.3%

California
14.2%
12.5%
7.5%

Nation
14.3%
9.6%
14.2%

SERVS., CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS (February 2005); Laura E. Lund, Asthma in Children and
Adolescents in California Counties, 2003, CAL. DEP’T OF HEALTH SERVS., CTR. FOR HEALTH
STATISTICS (Feb. 2005).
24. CAL. DIABETES PROGRAM, DIABETES IN CALIFORNIA COUNTIES: PREVALENCE, RISK
FACTORS AND RESOURCES 68 (2005); CAL. DIABETES PROGRAM, DIABETES IN CALIFORNIA
COUNTIES 67 (2009); CENT. VALLEY HEALTH & NUTRITION COLLABORATIVE & UNIV. OF CAL. COOP.
EXTENSION FOR FRESNO CNTY., CENTRAL VALLEY MALNUTRITION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2008).
25. CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, PESTICIDE-RELATED ILLNESS SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM, EXPOSURE BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY (2006); CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION,
PESTICIDE-RELATED ILLNESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, AGRICULTURAL DRIFT CASES REPORTED
BY CALIFORNIA PHYSICIANS (2006); see also California’s Central Valley: The Problem with
Pesticides, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 11–14, 2002), http://www.npr.org/programs/atc/features/2002/
nov/central_valley [hereinafter The Problem with Pesticides].
26. Julia Scott, State’s Nitrates Problem Grows Unchecked, S.F. CHRON., May 17, 2010, at A1.
For an explanation of nitrate poisoning and its implications in the rural context, please see JANICE
WOODARD ET AL., VA. COOP. EXTENSION, PUB. NO. 356-484, NITRATES IN HOUSEHOLD WATER
(2009), available at http://pubs.ext.vt.edu/356/356-484/356-484_pdf.pdf; Ctrs. for Disease Control &
Prevention, Methemoglobinemia Attributable to Nitrite Contamination of Potable Water Through
Boiler Fluid Additives, 46 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 202 (1997), available at
ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Publications/mmwr/wk/mm4609.pdf; Nitrate and Drinking Water from Private
Wells, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/drinking/
private/wells/disease/nitrate.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
27. TADLOCK COWAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33184, CALIFORNIA’S SAN JOAQUIN
VALLEY: A REGION IN TRANSITION 2, 50, 53, 56–59, 72–73, 79–82 (2005), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL33184.pdf; Local Area Unemployment Statistics,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?la (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (select
“California”; then select the appropriate “Areatype” (“Statewide” or “Metropolitan Areas”); then select
the appropriate “Area” (e.g., “MT061254 Bakersfield-Delano, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area”);
then select all four “Measures”; then select “Not Seasonally Adjusted”; then click “Next Form”).
28.
Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates: Estimates for California Counties, 2009,
U.S. CENSUS, http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/county.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011)
(select “2009” and “California” then “Continue;” select the relevant counties, check all variables
and click “Display Data”). It is important to note that this rate can vary seasonally to 40–60
percent unemployment in especially small, unincorporated Valley communities. Id.
Local Area Unemployment Statistics, supra note 27. The Valley data was calculated
29.
from county data, using a weighted average to account for population differences.
30. Matthew Bloch et al., Food Stamp Usage Across the Country, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/11/28/us/20091128-foodstamps.html.
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These figures only capture a fraction of the impact of underinvestment
and exclusion within unincorporated Valley communities. While farm
development has received some of the highest state and federal subsidies in the
country, these benefits often do not transfer to many Valley residents.31 In
particular, unincorporated communities lack basic infrastructure, including
paved roads, streetlights, sewage, and emergency services.32 These same
communities endure the highest environmental health risks in the state,
including the highest rates of water contamination exposure.33 Nevertheless,
unincorporated communities receive very little funding to address the structural
deficits that exacerbate poverty in their neighborhoods.34
Despite this stark landscape, the Valley’s poverty and environmental
health concerns are typical of other rural regions in the United States.
Throughout the nation, hundreds of unincorporated communities lack access to
clean drinking water.35 Moreover, many of these communities experience
“extreme” poverty that is similar to the Valley.36 The Valley, then, provides the
geographic scale required to evaluate the systemic and structural challenges to
accessing clean drinking water.
In informal interviews, Valley residents cited water as the primary issue
threatening their security and survival.37 Due to the heightened cost of attaining
31. California Water Subsidies: Large Agribusiness Operations—Not Small Family Farms—
Are Reaping a Windfall from Taxpayer-Subsidized Cheap Water, ENVTL. WORKING GROUP,
http://archive.ewg.org/reports/Watersubsidies (last visited Oct. 25, 2011); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/RCED-94-8, WATER SUBSIDES: IMPACT OF HIGHER IRRIGATION RATES ON CENTRAL
VALLEY PROJECT FARMERS (1994). For a case study of water subsidies in the context of a single
California water district, see Lloyd G. Carter, Reaping Riches in a Wretched Region: Subsidized
Industrial Farming and Its Link to Perpetual Poverty, 3 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 5 (2009), and
Mary Louise Frampton, The Enforcement of Federal Reclamation Law in the Westlands Water
District: A Broken Promise, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 89 (1979–1980).
32. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty and Exclusion at the Urban
Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1106–12 (2008) [hereinafter Anderson, Cities Inside Out].
33. ENVTL. JUSTICE COAL. FOR WATER, THIRSTY FOR JUSTICE: A PEOPLE’S BLUEPRINT FOR
CALIFORNIA WATER 57–58 (2005), available at http://www.ejcw.org/Thirsty for Justice.pdf.
34. Cowan, supra note 27, at 134–38.
35. Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 32, at 1106–12.
36. Rural Income, Poverty, and Welfare: Poverty Geography, ECON. RESEARCH SERV. (ERS),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/incomepovertywelfare/povertygeography.htm (last updated Sept. 17,
2011) (containing graphic titled, “Persistent-Poverty Counties, 2000”). ERS’s map illustrates the
geographic distribution of high-poverty rural counties. The Central Valley does not appear as a “nonmetro” or rural region because California’s rural cities are sufficiently populous to demarcate nearly
every rural California county as a metropolitan, not rural, county. Id.; Measuring Rurality: RuralUrban Continuum Codes, ECON. RESEARCH SERV., http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/Rurality/
ruralurbcon/ (last updated Apr. 28, 2004) (containing graphic titled, “Rural-Urban Continuum Codes,
2003”).
37. Ctr. on Race, Poverty & the Env’t, Survey of Client Communities (2010) (unpublished)
(results on file with author). The Center on Race, Poverty & the Environment (CRPE) conducts fairly
regular surveys of residents within its service communities to better meet client needs. Its surveys are
delivered at three- to five-year intervals through a full canvass of a given client community. Through
unstructured and informal conversations with approximately forty community members throughout the
Central Valley, when asked to identify the most important issues they worried about on a daily basis,
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potable water, the adverse health impacts of contaminated water, and the
opportunity costs of investing in water as opposed to human development
initiatives, residents expressed frustration and dismay over the impacts of poor
water access on their futures—impacts as severe as physical displacement.38
Several residents indicated that they hoped to leave their small landholdings to
their children for asset wealth, but they doubted the viability of these
landholdings in the absence of water.39
B. Unincorporated Communities as Loci for Structural Inequality
Unincorporated communities are prevalent throughout the United States,
and they are particularly concentrated in rural and agricultural communities. In
the Valley, there are over 450 unincorporated communities.40 Within the “lower
Valley” alone, there are 220 designated disadvantaged communities,41 housing
over 500,000 residents.42 Throughout the Valley, these unincorporated
communities are overwhelmingly composed of communities of color who have
been structurally excluded from formal cities.43
Throughout the 1900s, waves of migrants drawn by industrial and
agricultural job prospects settled in the Valley.44 These waves included Dust
Bowl migrants, Black farmers from the Great Migration, Latino farm workers,
Pilipino migrants, Japanese former internees, and Hmong and Laotian
refugees.45 Through a combination of social, political, economic, and legal
residents affirmed CRPE’s findings. Community members always listed access to affordable drinking
water among their top three concerns for the future of their communities and families.
38. Id.
39. Id.; Interview with residents of Allensworth, Cal. (May 26, 2010); Interview with residents
of Alpaugh, Cal. (May 25, 2010); Interview with residents of Wasco, Cal. (July 13, 2010).
40. José Padilla, Executive Director, California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., Address on Legal
Services for Rural California Communities, Fresno, Cal. (Mar. 5, 2011). In delivering his remarks on
the need for greater legal services for rural communities, Padilla summarized new (and at the time of
publication, unpublished) survey research showing that the number of unincorporated communities
through California’s Central Valley was much higher than previously estimated.
41. Community Equity Initiative, CAL. RURAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE, INC., http://www.crla.org/
node/30 (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter CRLA]; Unincorporated Communities: The
Community Equity Initiative, POLICYLINK, http://www.policylink.org/site/c.lkIXLbMNJrE/
b.5160111/k.8DA6/Unincorporated_Communities.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) [hereinafter
POLICYLINK]. California Rural Legal Assistance defines designated “disadvantaged communities” as
communities within the San Joaquin Valley (or lower Central Valley) that lack potable drinking water,
sewer systems, safe housing, public transportation, access to healthy food, sidewalks, streetlights, and
parks. CRLA, supra.
42. CRLA, supra note 41; POLICYLINK, supra note 41.
43. Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 931, 107–
08 (2010) [hereinafter Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy]; see also Table 2, infra Section
I.B.
44. Phoebe Seaton & Ilene J. Jacobs, Advocating for Equity in California’s Rural Communities,
RURAL VOICES, Winter 2009–2010, at 15–16; see generally MARK ARAX, WEST OF THE WEST (2009)
(narrating the present lives and historic experiences of different Central Valley communities).
45. ARAX, supra note 44, at 70, 314; JAMES N. GREGORY, AMERICAN EXODUS: THE DUST
BOWL MIGRATION AND OKIE CULTURE IN CALIFORNIA (1989); JAMES N. GREGORY, THE SOUTHERN
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factors, these communities were excluded from living within formal cities.46
Instead, they were relegated to settlement on the outskirts of Valley cities. As a
result, extremely resilient and resource-poor communities formed throughout
the Valley.47
The exclusion of communities of color and low-income white
communities from the Valley’s cities was not incidental—it was often an
intentional policy choice, reinforced through de jure and de facto race- and
class-based segregation.48 This pattern of segregation resulted in the creation of
unincorporated communities throughout the Valley, many of which are
overwhelmingly composed of communities of color. Because many of these
unincorporated communities often provide a home to workers, they can often
be found either adjacent to cities or adjacent to job opportunities.49
Paradoxically, however, several Valley counties have viewed
unincorporated communities as a drain on county services. Through intentional
practices of withholding essential infrastructure services, including water and
sewer services, Valley counties sought to “starve out” unincorporated
communities of color through policies of withholding public support.50

DIASPORA: HOW THE GREAT MIGRATIONS OF BLACK AND WHITE SOUTHERNERS TRANSFORMED
AMERICA 26–31 (2005); GERALD HASLAM, THE OTHER CALIFORNIA: THE GREAT CENTRAL VALLEY
IN LIFE AND LETTERS 13, 120 (1994); STEPHEN JOHNSON ET AL., THE GREAT CENTRAL VALLEY:
CALIFORNIA’S HEARTLAND 204 (1993); CRAIG SCHARLIN & LILIA V. VILLANUEVA, PHILIP VERA
CRUZ: A PERSONAL HISTORY OF FILIPINO IMMIGRANTS AND THE FARMWORKERS MOVEMENT
(2000); Dorothy Fujita Rony, Rereading Philip Vera Cruz, 3 J. ASIAN AM. STUD. 139 (2000); Melissa
Tav, Far Removed from Their Homeland, Many Hmong Learn to Thrive in California’s Central
Valley, COLLEGIAN (Oct. 12, 2007), http://collegian.csufresno.edu/2007/10/12/far-removed-fromtheir-homeland-many-hmong-learn-to-thrive-in-california’s-central-valley; UFW History: The Rise of
the UFW, UNITED FARM WORKERS, http://www.ufw.org/_page.php?menu=research&inc=history/
03.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
46. Seaton & Jacobs, supra note 44, at 15.
47. Victor Rubin et al., Unincorporated Communities in the San Joaquin Valley: New
Responses to Poverty, Inequity, and a System of Unresponsive Governance 2 (2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
48. Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 32, at 1101. Anderson has tracked the
characteristics and existence of unincorporated communities as well as provided a theoretical
framework for understanding patterns of underinvestment and exclusion of unincorporated
communities. See generally Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, supra note 43 (developing a
theoretical framework for evaluating and understanding racially exclusive urban annexation patterns
across the nation and the potential role for county governments in remediating the legacy of racially
exclusive disparate impacts for unincorporated low-income communities and communities of color).
49. Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 32, at 1096–97 (discussing the Valley community
of Bret Harte).
50. TULARE CNTY. PLANNING DEP’T, TULARE COUNTY GENERAL PLAN (1971); Rubin et al.,
supra note 47, at 2, 16, 18–19.
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Table 2: Racial Demographics for Nine Unincorporated Communities51
Community
Allensworth52
Biola53
Bret Harte
Fairmead
Kennedy
Kettleman City
South Dos Palos
Tooleville
Weedpatch54

API
1.7%
19.6%
1.6%
0.5%
8.0%
0.1%
2.2%
2.4%
0.5%

Race and Hispanic/Latino Identity
Black
Native Multiracial White
4.7%
0.0%
0.8%
7.3%
0.4%
2.6%
3.3%
3.7%
1.0%
1.0%
2.5%
34.4%
6.1%
1.6%
4.7%
30.0%
6.1%
0.7%
4.4%
9.3%
0.3%
0.6%
4.2%
2.7%
8.3%
0.6%
3.5%
39.3%
1.5%
6.2%
3.5%
31.0%
0.0%
2.9%
4.1%
5.6%

Latino
92.5%
73.7%
82.9%
68.0%
77.2%
96.1%
77.9%
82.3%
93.5%

For example, Tulare County, one of the poorest counties in the lower
Valley, identified strategies for removal through underinvestment in its 1971
General Plan:

51. Race,
Hispanic
or
Latino,
Age,
and
Housing
Occupancy:
2010,
2010 Census Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171) Summary File, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder2.census.gov (last visited Oct. 25, 2011) (search by entering “QT-PL” in the “Topic or
Table Name” box and the name of the community in the “Geography” box). Because Hispanic/Latino
identity is categorized as ethnicity in the census, population figures sometimes overlap with racial
subgroups (including “Asian & Pacific Islander,” “Black,” and “Multiracial”). Within this table, the
column “White” refers to non-Hispanic/Latino whites. The communities drawn in this sample
represent the “average” unincorporated community within each Valley county south of the Sacramento
River. Information for all unincorporated communities within each Valley county was aggregated and
evaluated to determine “typical” population and poverty trends within a given county. After selecting
the most representative sample community, I report information on these communities to illustrate
racial demographics across Valley counties. Data for unincorporated regions north of the Sacramento
River was less robust and not evenly available across all unincorporated communities.
52. Allensworth is the first African American city established west of the Mississippi. A
destination for African Americans leaving Jim Crow regimes in the South, Allensworth has
remained a significant city for the West’s African American population. ALICE C. ROYAL ET AL.,
ALLENSWORTH, THE FREEDOM COLONY: A CALIFORNIA AFRICAN AMERICAN TOWNSHIP (2008).
53. Biola, a census-designated place (CDP) outside of Fresno, is named for the Bible
Institute of Los Angeles. DAVID L. DURHAM, CALIFORNIA’S GEOGRAPHIC NAMES 1003 (1998).
While the Bible Institute is no longer headquartered in the community of Biola, its legacy
continues through Biola University, a private Christian university. See History & Heritage, BIOLA
UNIV., http://www.biola.edu/about/history (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
54. The Weedpatch labor camp was established during the Great Depression to house Dust
Bowl migrants. In THE GRAPES OF WRATH, John Steinbeck tells the story of the Joad family, a
group of Oklahoma refugees who have moved to California in search of jobs. The Joads spend a
significant amount of time in Weedpatch, which remains today as an unincorporated community
located southwest of the Central Valley city of Bakersfield in Kern County. JOHN STEINBECK,
THE GRAPES OF WRATH 254, 361 (Penguin 2002) (1939). For additional information on the
Weedpatch camp, see WEEDPATCH CAMP, http://weedpatchcamp.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2011)
(maintained by the Kern County Housing Authority); Hirotsugu Inoue, The Weedpatch Camp as a
Symbol of American Democracy, in JOHN STEINBECK—ASIAN PERSPECTIVES: SELECTED PAPERS
FROM THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL STEINBECK CONGRESS 215 (Kiyoshi Nakayama et al. eds.,
1990); WOODY GUTHRIE, Do Re Mi, on DUST BOWL BALLADS (RCA Victor Records 1940).
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Public commitments to communities with little or no authentic future
should be carefully examined before final action is initiated. These
non-viable communities would, as a consequence of withholding
major public facilities such as sewer and water systems, enter a process
of long term, natural decline as residents depart for improved
opportunities in nearby communities.55
The plan identified fifteen “non-viable” communities, all of which housed
primarily minority populations.56 The policy positions outlined in the plan also
failed to address how to incorporate these communities into city populations to
avoid displacement.57 Many of these communities had been relegated to the
least attractive and least fertile regions in the Valley when they arrived.58 Now,
after years of neglect, uncertainty regarding the availability of regular water or
other essential services has depressed home values,59 making it nearly
impossible for individuals within unincorporated communities to relocate
within their own counties. For example, despite forty years of withholding
infrastructure benefits, thirteen of the original fifteen “non-viable” communities
remain.60 The continuing existence of these unincorporated communities
suggests that efforts to withhold development do not encourage consolidation,
annexation, or relocation from unincorporated communities to cities. Instead,
the policy of withholding investment from these communities deepens
infrastructure inequality and ultimately maintains bleak levels of poverty.
In part because of decades of structural neglect and non-investment, these
communities experience overwhelming infrastructure deficits. Among those
deficits, lack of access to water and sanitation drives instability and lack of
certainty in long-term viability.

55. TULARE CNTY. PLANNING DEP’T, supra note 50, at § 2.D.3.
56. Census data for these communities is difficult to gather prior to 1990. Nevertheless,
examples of such “non-viable” communities included Allensworth, the first African American
community created west of the Mississippi. ROYAL ET AL., supra note 52. Established to escape racism
in the South and within Valley cities, Allensworth’s history is similar to the history of other
unincorporated communities throughout Tulare. Id. It is difficult to understand what marked
Allensworth, which thrived modestly but independently until the 1980s, for elimination beyond
animus towards these economically disadvantaged communities of color.
57. TULARE CNTY. PLANNING DEP’T, supra note 50, at § 2.D.3.
58. Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 32, at 1097; Anderson, Mapped Out of Local
Democracy, supra note 43, at 935–41.
59. For example, the median price for a home in Bret Harte, an unincorporated community
located by the Valley city of Modesto, is less than half the price for a home in Modesto proper.
Compare Bret Harte CDP, California, U.S. CENSUS, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html
(last visited Oct. 27, 2011) (median value, owner-occupied homes: $144,700), with City of Modesto,
California, U.S. CENSUS, http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2011)
(same: $314,500) (search by entering town and state into the “Fast Access to Information” search box).
Because the complete 2010 census has not yet been released for several rural CDPs, this comparison
uses the Census Bureau’s 2005–2009 American Community Survey data.
60. Forgotten Voices, CTR. ON RACE, POVERTY & THE ENV’T, http://www.crpeej.org/crpe/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=105&Itemid=103 (last visited Oct. 25,
2011).
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C. Lack of Access to Water as Social Inequality
Because of water’s central role in human settlement and development,
water inequality often compounds poverty and social inequality. Lack of water,
or lack of access to water, undermines human stability in at least three ways.
First, lack of access to water disrupts individuals’ reasonable expectations of
their ability to survive, and thrive, where they live. Second, lack of access to
water undermines human health and development. Finally, investments
required to bridge water access gaps displace resources that could be directed to
other economic development initiatives.
At the individual and family levels, water plays a crucial role in enabling
positive social and human development outcomes. Access to water helps
prevent exposure to life-threatening diseases and improves public health.61
Significantly, water has played a historic and continuing role in managing
public health quality.62 At the most basic level, proper water sanitation
minimizes the risk of exposure to water-borne diseases, but it also minimizes
the risk of concomitant diseases and their communicability.63 Access to clean
water increases life expectancy and quality of life outcomes (as measured in
DALYs), and it decreases total health expenditures on medical treatment and
care.64 As a result, improved personal health has been shown to have significant
positive effects on school attendance, educational achievement, and long-term
earning potential.65 These primary and secondary human development effects
play a significant role in determining Valley residents’ ability to develop
wealth through their own personal human capital.
Moreover, because water serves an essential role in human survival,
health, and safety, individuals will invest in procuring water regardless of its
proximity, affordability, or availability. These investments displace other
essential development goals, including investments in community welfare and
education. By investing in access to water, then, counties and local water
districts could absorb the burden of water provision and allow communities to
pursue their own development goals. Such public investments could allow
communities to build asset wealth, attain food security, and redirect costs and
hours spent procuring safe water toward other beneficial activities.

61. UNDP, supra note 17, at 27 (“Whether viewed from the perspective of human rights, social
justice or economic common sense, the damage inflicted by deprivation in water and sanitation is
indefensible. Overcoming that deprivation is not just a moral imperative and the right thing to do. It is
also the sensible thing to do because the waste of human potential associated with unsafe water and
poor sanitation ultimately hurts everybody.”).
62. Id. at 68–72; Healthy Water, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/healthywater (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
63. Id.; WHO & U.N. WATER, UN-WATER GLOBAL ANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF SANITATION
AND DRINKING WATER 1 (2010).
64. UNDP, supra note 17, at 27.
65. Health & Academics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
HealthyYouth/health_and_academics (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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Further, long-term investments in property depend upon steady access to
affordable, safe residential water.66 The reliability of water availability, in turn,
increases home and land values and stabilizes long-term settlement patterns.67
The relationship between water, land valuation, and permanence suggests that
lack of access to affordable, safe water severely undermines attempts to build
intergenerational property wealth. Instead of seeing returns on investments
made to improve residential property, water insecurity either eliminates these
benefits or results in depreciation over the lifetime of a single homeowner.
Unreliable or inadequate water access, then, plays a major role in undermining
asset wealth in the short- and long-term.
Beyond individual property holdings and health, water also plays an
essential role in regional economic and land development. In addition to
ensuring a healthy workforce, water enables settlement and the creation of new
projects and programs. In the lower Central Valley, unincorporated communities have clamored for water access to foster community-wide improvements,
such as building community gardens to address systemic hunger.68 Water is
essential for building housing, establishing community centers, and creating
jobs and new enterprises. Therefore, lack of access to water detrimentally
circumscribes the boundaries of economic development for unincorporated
communities by limiting the size of these communities and by limiting
residents’ ability to invest in local business enterprises or lot improvements.
Finally, the cost of securing water displaces other potential investment
opportunities, including investments in education, local improvement, and
business.69 For communities that bear disproportionate costs to obtain water,
the time and funding required to acquire residential water for survival purposes
limits the ability to put money and time toward other, perhaps more lucrative,
uses. Residents of rural, unincorporated communities often struggle to cover

66. UNDP, supra note 17, at 77; HESPERIAN FOUND., WATER FOR LIFE: COMMUNITY WATER
SECURITY 4 (2005). Note, however, that “water security” can also be used to refer to homeland
security
initiatives.
See Water Security,
U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/watersecurity (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
67. Raymond B. Palmquist & V. Kerry Smith, The Use of Hedonic Property Value Techniques
for Policy and Litigation, in THE INTERNATIONAL YEARBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS 2002/2003, at 115 (Thomas H. Tietenberg & Henk Folmer eds., 2003); François Des
Rosiers et al., Environment and Value: Does Drinking Water Quality Affect House Prices?, 17 J.
PROP. INV. & FIN. 444, 450–58 (1999). For general literature on water quality (but not drinking water
access) and home values, see generally DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY & TAXATION (1817); Melissa A. Boyle & Katherine A. Kiel, A Survey of House Price
Hedonic Studies of the Impact of Environmental Externalities, 9 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 117, 123–
26 (2009); J.H. Dales, Land, Water, and Ownership, 1 CAN. J. ECON. 791 (1968); Margaret Palmer et
al., Ecology for a Crowded Planet, 304 SCI. 1251 (2004).
68. Interview with residents of Allensworth, supra note 39; Interview with residents of
Alpaugh, supra note 39; Interview with residents of Wasco, supra note 39.
69. UNDP, supra note 17, at 27, 78 (“There is . . . an inverse relationship between price and
ability to pay: millions of the world’s poorest people pay some of the world’s highest prices for water,
to the detriment of their productive potential and well-being.”).
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the basic costs of food and water access, let alone longer-term investments or
educational opportunities.70 This hand-to-mouth existence raises the costs of
building intergenerational wealth, investing in long-term savings, and pursuing
certain educational and employment opportunities. Higher water costs, then,
add to other structural burdens, limiting rural residents’ freedom to pursue other
investment opportunities.
D. The Water Quality, Infrastructure, and Access Nexus
Water infrastructure deficits play a significant role in undermining both
water quality and access to water. Ailing and outdated water treatment systems
often fail to ensure that drinking water meets the quality standards outlined in
federal and state safe drinking water provisions.71 As old pipes, wells, and
pumps degrade, the risk of water contamination, including heavy metal
contamination, rises.72 Self-help infrastructure—such as water catchment
containers or wells—risk exposure to contaminated rain and groundwater.73
The cost of monitoring devices can vary widely, and water treatment options,
such as chlorine tablets, are often insufficient for purifying water within
regularly-used public water systems.74 As water systems fail to meet quality
standards, states are left with two options: the State can impose tariffs and fees
on noncompliant systems, or it can shut them down.
As a result, failing water infrastructure and poor water quality have direct
impacts on access to potable water. Water infrastructure is inherently
expensive, but it is even more so in rural contexts where sprawling geographies
and low population density undermine effective water delivery. Small water
systems75 can rarely afford the financing required for infrastructure

70. See Bloch et al., supra note 30 (showing that U.S. counties with the highest percentage of
residents on food stamps were rural counties with low populations); PUB. POLICY INST. CAL.,
POVERTY IN CALIFORNIA (2009).
71. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AGING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE RESEARCH
PROGRAM: ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE THROUGH INNOVATION 1 (2007); Hamida Kinge,
What’s on Tap: America’s Failing Water Infrastructure, NEXT AM. CITY, Fall 2009, at 33–35.
72. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 71, at 1; Kinge, supra note 71, at 33.
73. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 71, at 1.
74. Fourth Amended Complaint at 4–5, 11, 12, Kennedy v. City of Zanesville, 505 F. Supp. 2d
456 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (No. 2:03-CV-1047), 2005 WL 6165393 (describing the costs of installation and
maintenance of drinking water infrastructure, the costs of water treatment, and the costs of procuring
bottled water as a replacement for unsafe tap water); Reed N. Colfax, Kennedy v. City of Zanesville:
Making the Case for Water, HUM. RTS., Fall 2009, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/
human_rights_magazine_home/irr_hr_fall09_home/irr_hr_fall09_colfax.html; Thomas J. Prohaska,
Water Monitoring Seen as Cost Saver, BUFFALO NEWS (Sept. 13, 2010),
http://www.buffalonews.com/city/article188856.ece; Poor Water Quality and Human Health, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/drink/info/well/health.cfm (last visited Oct. 22,
2011); Healthy Water, supra note 62.
75. U.S. EPA defines “small public water systems” as systems that serve fewer than 3,300
users. Small Systems and Capacity Development, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://water.epa.gov/type/drink/pws/smallsystems/basicinformation.cfm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
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improvements, nor can their water users afford to fund improvements through
increased water rates or bonding. This stalemate imposes an ugly choice on
rural unincorporated water users: either residents can report water quality
violations and risk eliminating all access to residential water, or they can
choose not to report violations and risk exposure to unsafe water.
These equity features, combined with practical limitations, create a double
bind for residents of rural unincorporated communities. This disharmony is
driven, in part, by a lack of varied remediation options, but it is also driven by
California’s contradictory approach to ensuring its citizens receive the benefits
of the state’s water scheme.
II.
THE GAP BETWEEN WATER ON THE BOOKS AND WATER ON THE GROUND
Water has been a crucial feature of California’s development since its
admission to the Union. Early battles over water led to a populist movement
that provided the State with regulatory authority to manage and allocate water
resources for the greater benefit of the public. This governing authority is
echoed in the state constitution and in its statutory framework. This Part
reviews California’s statutory commitments regarding water distribution and
compares its stated policy goals to the realities of water use and access for rural
unincorporated residents.
A. The Statutory and Regulatory Scope of Water Protection
The California legislature assigned the authority to regulate and allocate
surface water rights to the California Water Commission in 1914, and, in 1928,
California voters adopted Article X Section 2 into the California Constitution,
requiring all water uses in the state be “reasonable and beneficial.”76 California
had adjudicated water rights since the Gold Rush, but disagreements on water
allocation, particularly between riparian farmers and proposed dam builders,
prompted the 1928 initiative.77 After adopting constitutional water protections,
the State commissioned water boards to implement water policy around
infrastructure, water quality, water rights allocation, and water management.78
To effectuate the State’s regulatory priorities and values, the California
Constitution provides that
the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put
to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and
that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of
water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to be

76.
77.
78.

Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 893 (Cal. 1967).
Id.
Id.
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exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof in
the interest of the people and for the public welfare.79
With this constitutional provision, the State established a water code that
created an elaborate and often contradictory system of state agencies and local
water districts to effectuate its goals of applying water to the “most beneficial
uses.”80 This utilitarian rhetoric justified and drove both the state and federal
government’s heavy investment in water infrastructure projects.81 These
projects include an elaborate system of diversions, dams, canals, and storage
basins to irrigate the Central Valley and arid southern California.82
While the contours of “beneficial” and “reasonable” uses have varied over
time,83 California courts have consistently held that domestic water use falls
within the range of beneficial uses and has the highest priority among water
uses.84 Their discussions of domestic water use often focus on municipal water
(for city residents) or on general household uses of water, including the use of
water for watering lawns or bathing. Further, the courts have interpreted
protection of the state’s “water resources” to include groundwater wells and
pumps,85 which historically have been viewed as private water systems beyond
the reach of government regulation.86 Under contemporary water jurisprudence,
79. CAL. CONST. art. 10, § 2.
80. Id.
81. For background on California water politics and the development of its massive water
projects, see generally DAVID CARLE, INTRODUCTION TO WATER IN CALIFORNIA (2004) (providing a
primer to California water issues); ROBERT DE ROOS, THE THIRSTY LAND: THE STORY OF THE
CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT (1948) (explaining the complex system of water infrastructure referred to
as the federal Central Valley Project); SHERIDAN DOWNEY, THEY WOULD RULE THE VALLEY (1947)
(discussing the federal government’s water infrastructure projects in California); ENVTL. JUSTICE
COAL. FOR WATER, supra note 33 (detailing the lack of access to drinking water across California’s
low-income communities and suggesting methods of improving water equity); HUNDLEY, supra note
16 (a comprehensive history of California water); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE
AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1993) (reviewing the ways in which massive
water projects fueled the growth of Los Angeles); George Skelton, Water Still Divides the State, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2009, at A2 (discussing persistent disagreements between the State’s northern cities,
central farms, and southern cities over water allocation); see also Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341
(1934), 298 U.S. 558 (1936), 373 U.S. 546 (1963), 376 U.S. 340 (1964), 383 U.S. 268 (1968), 439
U.S. 419 (1979), 460 U.S. 605 (1983), 466 U.S. 144 (1984), and 531 U.S. 1 (2000) (detailing the
continuing and epic battle between the States of California and Arizona over the water resources and
management of the Colorado River Basin).
82. HUNDLEY, supra note 16, at 123–71 (Los Angeles), 234-75 (Central Valley Project); see
generally DE ROOS, supra note 81.
83. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Greeson v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 59 F.2d 529
(9th Cir. 1931); City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000); Rancho Santa
Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533 (Cal. 1938); Williams v. Costa, 198 P. 1017 (Cal. Ct. App. 3d 1921).
84. Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1, 114–15, 184 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff’d and rev’d in part on
other grounds sub nom. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment
Dist. v. S. Cal. Water Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 502–03 (Ct. App. 2d 2003).
85. City of Barstow, 5 P.3d 853; Baldwin v. County of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886 (Ct. App.
3d 1994); State v. Super. Ct. of Riverside County, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 276 (Ct. App. 4th 2000); Central &
W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Ct. App. 2d 2003).
86. See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2006) (restricting federal regulation to navigable,
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California courts have also held that beneficial uses include water conservation
and ecosystem protection.87
As part of a nationwide effort to protect and distinguish the crucial
importance of drinking water from other water uses, the federal government
passed the U.S. Safe Drinking Water Act in 1974.88 California voters passed a
more expansive analogue, the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act
of 1986 (Proposition 65), to address a variety of environmental health concerns,
including drinking water contamination.89 A decade later, the California
Legislature adopted the California Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to develop public health goals regarding water quality standards for drinking water.90
Yet throughout California’s water legislation and case law, there is no
mention of the significance of drinking water for rural users, and there is
surprisingly little focus on drinking water, generally.91 To a certain extent,
California courts have subsumed drinking water within the larger idea of
municipal domestic water use. However, courts’ evaluation of domestic water
uses takes for granted the amenities of city life, assuming that municipal water
treatment and sanitation plants and piped water are available to all domestic
water users in the state. Unfortunately, these characterizations fail to account
for the inherent differences between rural drinking water and municipal
drinking water. As a result, current jurisprudence is unable to fully address
domestic water needs for unincorporated rural communities because it relies on
a model of domestic water delivery that is largely meaningless to rural water
users. Despite the necessity of ensuring access to drinking water for preserving
human life and health, rural water is almost wholly overlooked in state case
law. Even cases that focus on municipal water make little distinction between
residential water use for non-survival purposes, such as recreation, and
essential uses, such as drinking and cooking.92

and thus primarily surface, waters of the United States).
87. HUNDLEY, supra note 16, at 303–08; see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court
(Mono Lake case), 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (holding that “[t]he state has an affirmative duty to
take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources, and to protect
public trust uses whenever feasible,” including reversing usufructuary allocations that undermine
ecosystem stability and conservation).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2006).
89. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5–.13 (Deering 2011).
90. Id. § 116270.
91. A notable exception to this trend is CRLA’s recent court victory requiring the
implementation of California's right to safe, clean drinking water. Newton-Enloe v. Horton, 193 Cal.
App. 4th 1480 (2011). CRLA successfully argued that the State Department of Public Health was
required to create a safe drinking water implementation plan for communities in which water quality
failed to meet minimum standards for human consumption and residential use. Id.; Asociación de
Gente Unida por el Agua (AGUA) v. Horton, Case No. 09CEG03979, Stipulated Settlement
Agreement & Proposed Order (Fresno County Super. Ct., Nov. 8, 2011).
92. Rank v. Krug, 142 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff’d and rev’d in part on other grounds sub
nom. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963); Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal.
Water Co., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Ct. App. 2d 2003).
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In the rural context, cases addressing water allocation overwhelmingly
focus on agricultural irrigation districts.93 Through a series of state and federal
programs, California has subsidized and prioritized the provision of water for
agricultural irrigation, but it has not yet intervened in agricultural
contamination of rural drinking water sources, particularly when those sources
draw upon groundwater. The result is a rural water approach that focuses
almost exclusively on irrigation while missing the importance of ensuring clean
drinking water for rural, non-city residents.
Further, despite adopting drinking water quality standards, most of
California’s compliance efforts have been directed toward pre-existing water
districts. That is, California counties and cities rarely monitor private water
sources—such as wells and pumps—or non-municipal water sources created
after 1974.94 While the SDWA includes fairly broad definitions of “public
water system”95 and “source[s] of drinking water”96 to capture informal water
provision networks, very small water systems are often unmarked and
untested.97
Regardless of this monitoring gap, the State Legislature expanded the
breadth of the SDWA in 2006 to declare, “Every citizen of California has the
right to pure and safe drinking water.”98 This right, enshrined in the California
Health and Safety Code, outlines comprehensive monitoring and informationgathering responsibilities for the State Department of Public Health (DPH).99

93. Greeson v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 59 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1931); Herminghaus v. So. Cal.
Edison Co., 252 P. 607 (Cal. 1926); Turner v. James Canal Co., 99 P. 520 (Cal. 1909); Lux v. Haggin,
10 P. 674 (Cal. 1886).
94. According to the California Department of Public Health, “[p]rivate domestic wells are not
regulated by” the State’s Drinking Water Program. Instead, well-users are responsible for their own
monitoring and compliance. Drinking Water Program, CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH,
http://www.cdph.ca.gov/programs/pages/dwp.aspx (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
95. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 116275(h) (“‘Public water system’ means a system for
the provision of water for human consumption through pipes or other constructed conveyances that has
15 or more service connections or regularly serves at least 25 individuals daily at least 60 days out of
the year.”).
96. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.11(d) (“‘Source of drinking water’ means either a
present source of drinking water or water which is identified or designated in a water quality control
plan adopted by a regional board as being suitable for domestic or municipal uses.”).
97. The U.S. EPA defines public water systems (PWSs) as those systems which have at least
fifteen connections or that serve at least twenty-five individuals. Definition of a Public Water System
in SDWA Section 1401(4) as amended by the 1996 SDWA Amendments, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Aug.
5, 1998). Conversely, rural wells are often household-specific, or they may serve a small cluster of
households. While some wells provide water for an entire unincorporated community and are subject
to the SDWA, whether wells are tested or whether they qualify as PWSs varies by the size of a
community and the reliability of its well water. There are a few exceptions to this monitoring gap; for
example, heavy metal contamination or uranium contamination may be governed by the State
Department of Toxic Substances Control and may require remediation under the federal EPA’s
“Superfund” (CERCLA) and Toxic Substances Control Act provisions.
98. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 116270(a).
99. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 116325–116345.

05-Pannu-CORRECTED (Do Not Delete)

242

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1/27/2012 10:30 AM

[Vol. 100:223

However, the California SDWA offers few enforcement mechanisms,100 and as
a practical matter, the State has not moved to protect or guarantee the right to
pure and safe drinking water.101 The gap between rights on the books and rights
on the ground is particularly stark in the Valley.
B. The Realities of Rural Drinking Water Quality
The Valley is home to California’s most contaminated drinking water
sources, and many of the state’s most at-risk communities fall off the
regulatory monitoring grid.102 By their unique geographic configuration, rural
communities require alternate water infrastructures from the types of
infrastructure typically employed in urban municipalities. For the thousands of
families living in unincorporated communities in the Valley, the primary water
source is not municipal water services, but rather networks of public and
private wells.103
Further, the cost of accessing water is particularly high as a fraction of
total household income.104 Community organizational surveys show that

100. DPH’s only recourse for addressing water contamination that endangers human health is
to order remediation, petition that a system be placed in receivership, or shut down violative water
systems. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 116625, 116650–116675. In a region with very little
access to drinking water, shutting down a well, even a well above its maximum contaminant levels,
can effectively eliminate all running water for a community. See also Rose Francis & Laurel Firestone,
Implementing the Human Right to Water in California’s Central Valley: Building a Democratic Voice
Through Community Engagement in Water Policy Decision Making, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495,
514–15 n.77 (2011) (detailing the water costs and quality challenges facing several unincorporated
communities in the Valley’s Tulare County).
101. At the time of this draft, California had adopted a series of drinking water provisions that
entered into force through Senate Bill 2X1 (2007–08 Session). In addition to integrating drinking
water quality into its continually updated state water plan, revisions to California’s water management
statutes created a fund for community-driven research, but not for infrastructure investment, for unsafe
drinking water systems.
102. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, DRINKING WATER PROGRAM, ANNUAL COMPLIANCE
REPORT FOR PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS 2006 app. A–B [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL COMPLIANCE
REPORT], available at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/drinkingwater/Documents/DWdocuments/
AnnualComplianceReport2006.pdf; see also The Problem, COMMUNITY WATER CENTER,
http://www.communitywatercenter.org (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). The California Department of
Public Health explains in its annual drinking water quality reports that most private wells do not report
to the water quality assessment program. The Community Water Center shows that throughout the
Central Valley, and in particular in the southern San Joaquin Valley and Tulare County, the vast
majority of water users receive their residential water through private, relatively unregulated, wells.
103. Nearly 90 percent of unincorporated communities in the San Joaquin Valley rely on
groundwater for their drinking water needs. Francis & Firestone, supra note 100, at 498; Laurel
Firestone, Executive Director, Community Water Center, Testimony before the California Assembly
Committee on Water, Parks, and Wildlife regarding Management of California’s Groundwater
Resources (Feb. 1, 2011); see also Carolina Balazs, Third World Problems in California?: A Case
Study of Drinking Water in Tulare County 3 (May 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author) (providing a case study of groundwater contamination and reliance in the unincorporated
Valley community of Alpaugh).
104. In some households, these costs are as high as 10 percent of monthly income. Phoebe
Seaton, Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Presentation on Central Valley Drinking Water at the
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unincorporated, low-income, rural communities of color spend over 10 percent
of their annual incomes purchasing residential water, often through a
combination of payments to local water districts and purchases of bottled
drinking water.105 This figure is four times larger than U.S. EPA’s
recommended threshold payment level for affordable water.106
For example, one resident of Matheney Tract, an unincorporated
community adjacent to Tulare City, expressed deep anxiety over whether she
could afford sufficient drinking water for her children.107 As a resident of two
water districts, this Matheny resident paid over $900 per year in water district
rates and fees, in addition to hundreds of dollars to procure bottled drinking
water.108 She relied on bottled water for cooking and drinking water because
the well in her resident water district had been exposed to ground-injected
hazardous waste from a nearby pesticide processing plant.109
Water contamination in the Central Valley is driven by its industrial
agricultural economy. While California did not regulate water contamination
from agricultural lands or projects until 2011,110 the legacy of agricultural
pollution persists throughout the Valley. Pesticide and fertilizer runoff is the
principal source of water contamination in Valley counties,111 with industrial
manufacturing waste and heavy metals constituting the remainder of water
quality pollutants.112 These agro-industrial contaminants include nitrates
(NO3)113 derived from fertilizer; coliforms, a product of animal waste;114 and
Environmental Justice Symposium, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Feb. 2009); see
also Interview with the citizens of Matheny Tract, Cal., (Oct. 30, 2010). Within Matheny Tract (Tulare
City), Fairmead (Chowchilla), Parkview (Modesto), and Alpaugh (Wasco), communities pay as much
as $400 per year for irrigation districts from which they receive no water, on top of $1,800 per year for
residential water. Id.; Interview with citizens of Alpaugh, supra note 39; Community of Fairmead,
supra note 1; Interview with citizens of Wasco, supra note 39. Given an average individual income of
$9,000 and an annual average household income of $18,000 of those interviewed, this translates to a
cost of over 12 percent of annual income. This is approximately five times the EPA’s suggested levels
for “affordable water.” U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NATIONAL
DRINKING WATER ADVISORY COUNCIL TO U.S. EPA ON ITS NATIONAL SMALL SYSTEMS
AFFORDABILITY CRITERIA 17 (July 2003).
105. Sofia Parino, Ctr. on Race, Poverty & the Env’t, Presentation on the Tulare County
General Plan, Delano, Cal. (May 28, 2010).
106. Small Drinking Water Systems Variances—Public Water Systems, U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/infrastructure/drinkingwater/pws/affordability.cfm (last
visited Oct. 25, 2011) (explaining that EPA regulations state that a system is affordable if annual water
costs fall within 2.5 percent of local median income).
107. Because this interview was conducted in an informal setting, the identity of the speaker
has been withheld to protect her privacy. Interview with residents of Matheny Tract, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. The Problem with Pesticides, supra note 25.
111. Brian Cohen & Richard Wiles, Pouring It On: Nitrate Contamination of Drinking Water,
ENVTL. WORKING GROUP (Feb. 1996), http://www.ewg.org/reports/nitrate.
112. 2006 ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 102.
113. Nitrates constituted over 80 percent of all inorganic Maximum Contamination Level
(MCL) violations. Id. at app. A.
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heavy metals and chemical compounds, such as benzene, selenium, and
cadmium.115 The majority of nitrate violations are concentrated in Tulare
County, while coliform contamination persists across at least 70 percent of
public water systems throughout the Valley.116
As a result of this agricultural industrial economy, water quality in the
region is notoriously poor, and the number of water contamination violations
has steadily increased since DPH began monitoring rural drinking water
systems in 2006.117 In 2006, over 20 percent of the Valley’s public water
systems tested above the state’s Maximum Contamination Level (MCL).118 In
2007, 56 percent of all MCL violations in the state took place in the Valley,
while only 18.1 percent of California’s population resided in the Valley.119
Further, because these figures do not include most small and well-based water
systems, even the State’s current measures of drinking water contamination in
rural areas are significantly understated.
The health impact of these MCL violations is dramatic. Prolonged
exposure to nitrate pollution can result in hormone disruption among adults,
often undermining reproductive ability or increasing the likelihood of birth
defects and miscarriages.120 Among infants and children, nitrates disrupt the
body’s ability to carry oxygen in the blood, resulting in slow, painful
suffocation (“blue baby syndrome”).121 Coliforms and other biological
contaminants, particularly Escherichia coli (E. coli) and Giardia, are primary
114. Coliforms constituted over 75 percent of all drinking water MCL violations. Id.
115. Id. at 6. In 2007, California water systems posted 805 MCL violations; 456 (56.6 percent)
of these violations came from total coliforms. CAL. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, DRINKING WATER
PROGRAM, ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT FOR PUBLIC WATER SYSTEMS 2007 app. D (2009)
[hereinafter 2007 ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT], available at http://www.cdph.ca.gov/certlic/
drinkingwater/Documents/DWdocuments/2007ComplianceReportAmendedAug182009corrected.pdf.
116. 2006 ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 102, at app. C; 2007 ANNUAL
COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 115, at 5; see also Carolina Balazs, Presentation on Water
Contamination in California’s Central Valley at the Environmental Justice Symposium, University of
California, Berkeley, School of Law (2009) (mapping MCL violations in the State and demonstrating
that the most acute incidence of violations occurs in Central Valley counties).
117. In 2006, the State Department of Public Health reported that total water quality violations
had increased 19 percent, and that this growth was largely driven by an explosive increase (311
percent) in nitrate contamination. 2006 ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 102, at app. A–B.
Nitrate contamination was significantly concentrated in agricultural California communities. Id.
118. 40 C.F.R. § 141.2 (2011) (“Maximum contaminant level means the maximum permissible
level of a contaminant in water which is delivered to any user of a public water system.”); 2006
ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 102, at app. C. The California Safe Drinking Water and
Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Cal. SDWA) sets cutoff points for the state’s Maximum
Contamination Levels. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5, 116270 (Deering 2011). Levels of
contamination below the MCL are not necessarily safe, but they do not rise to a high enough level to
merit enforcement under the federal or state SDWA.
119. 2007 ANNUAL COMPLIANCE REPORT, supra note 115, at app. D. Of the 805 MCL
violations in the state, 478 violations took place in Central Valley communities.
120. Firestone, supra note 103; see also WOODARD ET AL., supra note 26 (describing blue
baby syndrome and explaining its prevalence in agricultural communities).
121. WOODARD ET AL., supra note 26.
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vectors for waterborne diseases, including dysentery and other severe
gastrointestinal diseases that may result in dehydration and death.122
These water-based health costs exacerbate vulnerability for communities
that already face extreme toxic exposure and public health concerns.123 In
addition to underwriting the State’s failure to protect their statutory right to
clean, pure drinking water, communities throughout the Central Valley are
unable to penetrate California’s complex system of water government to
advocate for policy change. Nevertheless, bridging the gap between the State’s
stated drinking water policy and the impacts for water users is severely
impaired by California’s labyrinthine, fragmented, and outdated system of state
and local water governance.
III.
THE STRUCTURE OF CALIFORNIA WATER GOVERNANCE
At both state and local levels, California’s system of water management is
highly fragmented. The California Water Code, while innovative, reveals a
history of tacking new local government models on to older ones that failed to
meet the needs of municipalities and industry.124 Similarly, its allocation of
regulatory responsibility across state agencies illustrates the State’s hodgepodge, “design as you go” system. Describing both the allocation of
responsibility and mechanisms for public input at the state and local levels, this
Part illustrates the structural barriers to accomplishing the State’s statutory
goals around safe and clean drinking water.
A. Fractured Governance
After establishing the State’s constitutional authority to manage water
resources, California created statewide and local boards to implement water
policy around infrastructure, water quality, and water management.125 In 1956,
it created the Department of Water Resources to monitor water infrastructure

122. Global Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/global/wash_diseases.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
123. For a heartbreaking, yet quintessential, example of these cumulative harms, see Jacques
Leslie, What’s Killing the Babies of Kettleman City?, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 2010, at 44, available
at http://motherjones.com/environment/2010/07/kettleman-city-toxic-birth-defect-cluster. See also
Titania Kumeh, Kettleman City’s Toxic Web, MOTHER JONES, July/Aug. 2010, at 48, available at
http://motherjones.com/environment/2010/07/kettleman-city-toxic (mapping cumulative environmental health risks around the unincorporated community of Kettleman City).
124. The California Water Code provides for a large array of potential local water districts.
This move towards localism was seen as a net benefit, allowing the vastly different ecological regions
of the state to adopt water management systems that were appropriate to their needs and climate. As a
result, the Water Code has served as a model for water localism within other western states. As is
discussed further in this section, this structure may fall short of ensuring coordinated and responsive
water management.
125. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 893 (Cal. 1967).
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projects and to provide planning for water use.126 In 1967, the legislature
established the State Water Resources Control Board to authorize water
allocations and arbitrate water rights.127 Together, these departments were
intended to provide a unified vision and a set of uniform policies for water
planning and use throughout the state.
While this early organization of water governance sought to provide
comprehensive, integrated water resource management, the state’s system for
allocating riparian rights, managing water infrastructure, ensuring water
quality, and meeting its environmental and ecological water goals is highly
fragmented. Instead, over ten separate state agencies and sub-agencies regulate
and monitor California’s long- and short-term water planning and use, often
with overlapping and contradictory mandates.128 For example, the State Water
Resources Control Board is most concerned with allocating water rights, but
the State Department of Fish and Game is charged with maximizing water
resources in order to support sustainable aquaculture and recreational fishing.129
In times of water scarcity, these competing mandates often set agencies at
opposite ends as they attempt to distinguish the proper priority and weight each
water use should hold.
As a result, the State’s commitment to clean drinking water is divided
from its water quality enforcement provisions, and its allocation of water rights
is segregated from its other policy priorities for water. As of 2006, when the
legislature created California’s statutory right to “pure and clean” drinking
water, no single agency claimed responsibility for evaluating the delivery of
residential water to effectuate this right. Further, the State made little effort to
evaluate access to drinking water beyond collecting monitoring data in
compliance with the federal and state Safe Drinking Water Acts.

126. Id.; CAL. WATER CODE § 120 (Deering 2011).
127. History of the Water Control Boards, STATE WATER RES. CONTROL BOARD,
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/about_us/water_boards_structure/history.shtml (last updated Sept. 20, 2011).
128. See infra Table 3.
129. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5096.357 (Deering 2011); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 700,
15100 (Deering 2011).
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Table 3: Water Policy and Enforcement Power by State Agency130

130. Data collected from numerous provisions of the California Code. See generally CAL.
GOV. CODE (Deering 2011); CAL. NAT. RES. CODE; CAL. WATER CODE (describing the
responsibilities and purview of statewide agencies with some element of regulatory power over state
waterways and water systems).
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B. Anti-Democratic Governance Models at the State Level
In addition to the heavy fragmentation of regulatory responsibility,
California does not afford its citizens any rights to elect the directors of their
statewide water management agencies.131 Instead, all department heads, agency
secretaries, and board members are appointed by the governor and confirmed
by the state senate.132 In some cases, representatives are appointed by county
boards of supervisors or by federal agencies.133 Regional water quality boards,
the only state agencies with a mandated responsibility to their service region,
are also appointed directly by the governor as sub-entities of the State Water
Resources Control Board.134 There is no voter review or approval of these
appointments, nor is there a mechanism for voter-led removal from office. In
fact, confirmation is routine, and agency directors and board members are
rarely removed from office. In effect, state water management agencies, unlike
comparable analogues such as the State Office of Public Instruction, are formed
and guided in a democratic vacuum.135
There are strategic advantages to an appointment-only method of
selection. For example, an appointment-based system insulates decision makers
from populist movements that may not serve the long-term interests of the
state, and it creates a mechanism for appointing water experts while also
delineating standards for technical expertise. Nearly every board has strict
statutory provisions regarding membership qualifications, which ensure a
baseline level of expertise or specialized training in disciplines that impact
water governance. These provisions attempt to maintain balance across
stakeholders when partisan administrations change, but these provisions also
seek to ensure that the wide variety of skills required to effectively manage
water are consolidated in one governing body.

131. See infra tbl.4a.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. CAL. WATER CODE § 13200. While there is a statutory preference for regional residents
on the Regional Water Control Boards, there is no residency requirement or requirement that board
members be water users within the region. Id.
From the State’s inception, California voters established a publicly-elected, executive135.
level Superintendent of Public Instruction to oversee the state’s public education system. CA. CONST.
OF 1849, tit. XI, § 1. Voters reaffirmed direct election of the Superintendent—as opposed to
appointment by the Governor or State Board of Education—indicating that educational policy was
seen as a core feature of the state’s growth and economic development. Dr. Edwin F. Klotz, Testifying
on Senate Resolution 357, Analysis of the Relationship of the State Board of Education and the State
Superintendent of Public Instruction (1967) (available at http://www.cde.ca.gov/nr/re/hd/documents/
yr1967hd.doc).
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Table 4a: Water Governance
and Resident Participation at the State Level136

136. Data collected from numerous provisions of the Code identified in the “Authority”
column. See generally CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE (Deering 2011); CAL. WATER CODE.
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Nevertheless, allocating the power of water resources management to the
governor’s appointees departs from the state’s traditional system for governing
constitutional resources and rights. Allowing the governor to select appointees
enables powerful donors, lobbying interests, and advocacy groups to prevail
through the appointments process. Further, an appointments-based governance
system for water falls out of step with other core rights created through the
California Constitution.
For example, in addition to electing the governor, lieutenant governor,
attorney general, and state controller as executive officers, California voters
elect the state superintendent of public instruction and the state insurance
commissioner.137 The nonpartisan position of state superintendent oversees
coordination and the fulfillment of California’s constitutional commitment to
public K–12 education.138 The position of insurance commissioner was created
by proposition in 1988 to monitor, audit, license, and regulate insurance within
the state.139 Despite the enormous role water has played in the development,
politics, and future of the state since the Gold Rush, the state has subordinated
water oversight compared to other state constitutional rights.
As a result of the state’s lack of investment in water oversight,
California’s citizens have no method of redress or petition to state boards
beyond narrow regulatory exchanges or commentary at public hearings. If a
concern does not fit neatly into the mandate of an agency, it may be deferred or
ignored entirely. There is no transparent or clear system of accountability,
except by directing complaints regarding the actions of an agency, director, or
board directly to the legislature or governor. The cost of traveling to lobby the
State and of moving sufficient votes to achieve a policy directive is especially
high for rural residents who lack concentrated geographic populations that
could support traditional community organizing methods, let alone lobbying
resources. Instead, urban residential users and large agricultural interests
dominate water policy debates, crowding out the voices of rural residents.
By virtue of its current structure, California’s water governance system
obscures the challenges rural communities face surrounding water prioritization
and allocation. It further evades review and input by relying solely on the
governor to provide democratic accountability. By focusing on balancing
industry and conservation demands, the State has skipped over the needs of a
large yet silenced third constituency—non-municipal residential water users.
137. CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 14(f).
138. CAL. CONST. art. 3, § 8(l), art. 5 § 14(f), art. 9 § 2; see generally CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
33110–33133 (Deering 2011).
139. CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 14(f); SEC’Y OF STATE OF CAL., CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAMPHLET:
GENERAL ELECTION NOVEMBER 9, 1988, 98–101, 140–44, available at http://traynor.uchastings.edu/
ballot_pdf/1988g.pdf; SEC’Y OF STATE OF CAL., HISTORY OF CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES 7 (2002),
available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/init_history.pdf; About Us: Introduction to CDI
Operations, CAL. DEP’T INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0500-about-us/0100-cdi-introduction (last
visited Oct. 26, 2011).
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Beyond state agencies, California relies on a complex system of public
and quasi-public local water districts to distribute and allocate water. In the
rural context, a number of “self-help” districts have been created to fill the gap
between state regulation and the geographic limits of municipal water.
However, as discussed below, this system of local water government fails to
bridge the gap between state and local needs and instead tends to further
fracture water governance.
C. Anti-Democracy in Local Water Governments
Given the high costs for small communities in attempting to move state
water governance structures—whether agencies or the legislature—the
battleground for day-to-day water management and access takes place within
local water governments. There are over 3,877 water districts in the western
United States alone, representing 29.9 percent of all special purpose local
governments in the West.140 The California legislature recognized the superior
flexibility and responsiveness of localities in addressing water needs within the
Water Code:
The Legislature hereby finds and declares as follows:
(a) The various regions of the state differ widely in the availability of
water supplies and in the need for water to meet beneficial uses.
(b) Decisions regarding operations to meet water needs can depend in
part upon regional differences.
(c) Many water management decisions can best be made at a local or
regional level, to the end that local and regional operational flexibility
will maximize efficient statewide use of water supplies.141
The State has further charged local governments with ensuring state policy
goals are met, but it is less clear whom residents may petition if drinking water
quality has failed.142
California’s local water governance structure provides for at least fourteen
ways through which local water government districts can be formed to manage
and distribute water.143 When a given water district structure failed to meet the
needs of its water users, different industrial enterprises, developers, and
communities experimented with new water district formations, which were

140. Governments—Individual State Descriptions, in U.S. CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS (2007),
available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/all_ind_st_descr.pdf. Further, water districts constitute
18.8 percent of all local governments in the American West. This designation does not include school
districts or tribal governments. The phrases “western United States” and “American West” include the
states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Wyoming.
141. CAL. WATER CODE § 380 (Deering 2011) (emphasis added).
142. Id. §§ 380, 66473.7(b)(1).
143. See infra Table 4b.
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chaptered into the State’s Code.144 Originally this plethora of organizational
options was designed to support and prioritize local experimentation.145 Today,
these divisions continue to fragment the State’s water management apparatus,
resulting in high-cost, inaccessible, and undemocratic management systems at
the local level.
In creating a framework that enables a wide array of local water
governments, the California legislature embraced a water management system
that would prioritize local flexibility and experimentation.146 Originally
formulated to serve urban localities, the State Water Code now encompasses an
inordinate number of ways to pursue local water governance. Its local
management system is divided into “public,” “quasi-public,” and “private”
management systems at the local level.147
Public systems are those systems in which all residents within the
boundaries of a water district may vote and participate in the decisions of that
district. These systems are most common in California’s northern cities, and
they operate on traditional notions of local government, including notice of rate
changes or changes to district operations, as well as a “one person, one vote”
voting scheme for election of public water system governors. Public systems
retain the full authority and powers of local governments, including the powers
of eminent domain, taxation, and bonding.148
The State Water Code also enables the creation of quasi-public water
systems, which enjoy the powers of a public water district (taxation, bonding,
eminent domain) but limit the franchise to landowners within their boundaries.
Unlike public systems, quasi-public systems do not allow all residents within
their boundaries to participate in decision making. Instead, the power to vote
within the district over essential decisions—such as water rates, infrastructure
projects, or whether or not to flood land—is limited only to landowners.149
Although individuals who live within the region but own less than one acre of
land are excluded from voting in quasi-public districts, quasi-public districts
have the power to levy fees upon non-voting residents.
Finally, private water systems are self-organized associations and
corporations. One of the largest private water systems, the for-profit California
Water Service Company, sells water to local water districts throughout
Southern California.150 Private water systems may be private real property
144. See id.
145. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 380, 66473.7(b)(1) (Deering 2011).
146. Id. § 370(c).
147. See infra Table 4b.
148. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 71690–71700, 31040–31054 (property, contract, and eminent
domain); id. §§ 71852–71854, 31370–31372 (bonding); id. §§ 72090–72102, 31615–31618 (taxation);
id. §§ 71590–71601, 31000–31016 (general powers).
149. See, e.g., id. §§ 35003–35006, 30700.5, 41000–41020, 21553–21554 (delineating landbased voting systems for several types of quasi-public water districts).
150. About Cal Water, CAL. WATER SERV. CO., http://www.calwater.com/about/index.php
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holdings (e.g., a private well on one’s land), water cooperatives, or formal
water companies.151 These systems own their water rights under the framework
of the common law of real property, and all acquisitions or investments in
water infrastructure are made from their own profits and income, not from
bonding or taxation.152
Tulare County, with the highest nitrate contamination levels in the state
and a majority Latino population, offers a prime example of the bureaucratic
nightmare that unincorporated residents face when attempting to petition their
local governments. At the state level, Tulare County’s water is regionally
managed by the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board, under
the auspices of the State Water Resources Control Board.153 Within the county,
there are over thirteen water governance schemes in a region with only three
urbanized areas.154 This includes a water commission, whose function is to
advise the county supervisors and whose members are appointed by the board
of supervisors. There are nine sewage districts and three irrigation districts. The
California Water Service provides drinking water to Visalia and other cities
within Kern County, the county neighboring Tulare to the south.
I argue that this hyperdivision at the local level, combined with the state’s
system of agency fragmentation, undermines the ability of both the State and
localities to prioritize human welfare in water planning. This Part will map the
public, quasi-public, and private management established in the Water Code to
explain how these different management systems limit, layer, and exclude
water uses and water users.
1. The Limits of Public Water Districts
A public water district is a form of local water government that provides
domestic water to all residents within its territory. These districts, like a city
redevelopment agency or town council, hold regular public meetings and make
their minutes and agendas publicly available. These districts are tax exempt and
enjoy the powers of eminent domain, bonding, and taxation (i.e., determination
of user rates).
Only half of California’s statutory water districts allow residents to have a
direct, electoral influence on the formation and governance of a water

(last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
151. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2701.
152. Id. §§ 2725–2729.
153. As an example of the extent to which even regional boards, which are not elected, serve
the interests of municipalities, the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board has been
engaged in a three-year plan to assess contamination in public water systems, primarily in city water
supplies.
154. These areas include Visalia/Woodlake, Porterville, and Dinuba. While there are several
more incorporated municipalities in Tulare, with the exception of these “urban” regions, population
density is relatively uniform between the remaining unincorporated and incorporated regions.
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district.155 Residents within the district are able to vote for the election of
district directors, and they often vote to authorize the issuance of bonds for
specific infrastructure projects.156 Residents also participate in scoping plans
and long-term management plans to invest in water infrastructure and account
for population growth.157 The most common participatory districts158 include
municipal districts, county water districts, and municipal water districts.159
However, these “public” water districts all require a critical mass of residents in
order to reach the economies of scale necessary to affordably build water
infrastructure.160
Because so many rural communities in the Valley are composed of fewer
than 1,000 residents, they are often unable to reach the scale required to build
new water infrastructure.161 While rural Valley communities have attempted to
utilize generalized “special-purpose districts” (or special districts)162 to pool
resources for local water delivery, these districts also fail to reach the scale
required to ensure safe water delivery.
While many unincorporated communities lack access to clean drinking
water, it is not for want of local water governments. Most Valley communities
live within the boundaries of at least two water districts, a phenomenon
paralleled in other rural communities in the West.163 Despite living within the
155. See infra Table 4b.
156. CAL. WATER. CODE. §§ 71940–71947.
157. Id. §§ 10910–10915.
158. I use the phrases “participatory districts” and “participatory water districts” to distinguish
between local governments in which all residents of a geographic territory are allowed participation in
water district formation and election of district commissioners. These districts are contrasted by
“quasi-public” districts, which link the franchise to landownership, weighting votes in favor of
landowners with greater land acreage or land value and limiting voter eligibility for resident renters
and small landholders.
159. See Governments—Individual State Descriptions, supra note 140, at 37–47; Local
Governments and Public School Systems by Type and State: 2007, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2007/GovOrgTab03ss.xls (last visited Oct. 25, 2011). Municipal
(city) districts and municipal water districts are distinct in that they are governed by different
parameters through California.
160. Bagi, supra note 18, at 40.
161. ALEJANDRA LOPEZ, CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN RACE & ETHNICITY, LATINO
COMMUNITIES OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY: POPULATION, FAMILIES, AND HOUSEHOLDS 7 (2001); see
also Anderson, Cities Inside Out, supra note 32, at 1125–30 (discussing urban unincorporated areas,
including unincorporated pockets around the City of Modesto); see generally ALEJANDRA LOPEZ,
CTR. FOR COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN RACE & ETHNICITY, RACE AND POVERTY IN CALIFORNIA:
CENSUS 2000 PROFILES (2002) (highlighting that the state’s poverty—and non-white populations—is
concentrated in the Central Valley).
162. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 16270 (Deering 2011). The phrase “special-purpose district” is a
local government law term of art; it refers to any local government formed with a fairly narrow or
specific purpose in mind. California offers a general authorization to form special districts, provided
members of that district can meet certain statutory requirements, so that its residents can self-organize
to invest in community improvements when another model of local government may be insufficient or
ill suited for such a narrow purpose.
163. Local Governments and Public School Systems by Type and State, U.S. CENSUS OF
GOVERNMENTS (2007), http://www2.census.gov/govs/cog/2007/GovOrgTab03ss.xls (last visited Oct.
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boundaries of water districts, most rural districts are quasi-public, ensuring that
residents of the area cannot formally participate in the district’s decisions
regarding water allocation, flood planning, and water infrastructure
development.164
Moreover, the California Water Code allows each water district a “first in
time” right to trump any pre-existing county policies regarding water
management.165 Because water districts have narrow mandates compared to
general local governments, such as counties, the Water Code grants primacy to
water districts over counties, even if those water districts are formed later in
time.166 The Code ensures that each water district can enforce its claims to
water against nearly all other water users, including any younger water
districts.167 For example, if landowners establish an irrigation district, and later
tenants establish a special drinking water district, the irrigation district takes
precedence in water decision-making and allocations, even if these districts
seek to manage the same water resources. While these overlapping districts
battle for allocations from the same “pot” of water resources, rural residents
continue to lack access to reliable, safe water.
As a result, communities often pay double: once for unfit residential water
and once again for bottled water to meet their drinking and cooking needs.
After paying these baseline costs, communities are typically subjected to
improvement and remediation fees for irrigation and other water districts that
do not provide residential water.168 Domestic water costs for unincorporated
rural residents are therefore extravagant when compared to their urban peers.169

26, 2011).
164. Id.
165. CAL. WATER CODE § 20500 (Deering 2011).
166. Id.
167. Id. Water districts may not, however, displace pre-existing municipal (city) water policies.
168. Interview with citizens of Matheny Tract, supra note 104; see also discussion supra note
104 and accompanying text (describing these fees as a percentage of average annual household
income).
169. UNDP, supra note 17, at 78 (“There is also an inverse relationship between price and
ability to pay: millions of the world’s poorest people pay some of the world’s highest prices for
water.”).
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Governance District
Public Districts
Municipal (City) Water170
Municipal Utility Districts171
Municipal Water Districts172
County Water Districts173
Water Conservation Districts174
Water Replenishment Districts175
Levee Districts176
Wastewater Districts177
Special Districts178
Quasi-Public Districts
Mutual Water Company179
California Water Districts180
County Drainage Districts181
Improvement Districts182
Distribution Districts183
California Water Storage Districts184

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

CAL. GOV’T CODE § 34000 (Deering 2011).
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 11501 (Deering 2011).
CAL. WATER CODE § 7100 (Deering 2011).
Id. § 30000.
Id. § 74000.
Id. § 60000.
Id. § 70000.
Id. §§ 1210–1212.
CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 16270–16279.5 (Deering 2011).
CAL. WATER CODE § 2701.
Id. § 34000.
Id.§ 5600.
Id. § 75000.
Id. § 23500; id. § 36460.
Id. § 39000.
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2. The Pervasiveness of Quasi-Public Governance
Quasi-public water distric ts also appear in the Water Code, but in practice
these are private, tax-exempt districts with State-delegated powers of eminent
domain, taxation, and the a uthority to issue public bonds.185 The most common
quasi-public districts in California’s Central Valley include irrigation districts,
reclamation districts, and improvement districts,186 and the total number of
quasi-public districts in the Valley outpaces the number of public water
districts.187 Similarly, irrigation districts and river districts are the most
common water districts in the American West.188
While these districts technically allow electoral participation, they limit
voting rights to individuals (not necessarily residents) who own title to land
within the district’s area of focus.189 Most quasi-public districts weigh voting in
relation to the value of a landowner’s property: that is, the larger a person’s
property holdings (in acres) or the greater the value of the holding, the more
votes that are allocated to that owner.190 Effectively, those who own more land
have more political power, and those who do not own land (or who own small
plots) are ineligible to vote in these districts. As a result, large landholders not
only control the boards for these districts, but they also control policy and the
frequency of elections.191 Additionally, this structure allows corporations, as
landowners, to vote within these water districts.192
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently upheld this system of land-based
participation in water districts, particularly in irrigation districts.193 In Salyer
Land Company v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District194 and Ball v.
James,195 the Supreme Court held that limiting the right to vote for water board
directors could be reasonably limited to landowners.196 Even though these
districts were considered quasi-public water districts that had been authorized
under the state codes of California and Arizona, respectively, the Court held
that a land-based system of voting did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause’s “one person, one vote” principle.197 In so holding,
the Court emphasized the “narrow” nature of both projects, indicating that
185. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 735–42 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
186. Governments—Individual State Descriptions, supra note 140.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See infra Table 4b.
190. CAL. WATER Code §§ 20930, 30700.5–30700.6, 36490, 39903 (Deering 2011).
191. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 735–42 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 741–42.
193. Id. at 726–30 (majority opinion); Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
194. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. 719.
195. Ball, 451 U.S. 355.
196. Salyer Land. Co., 410 U.S. at 421; Ball, 451 U.S. at 358.
197. Salyer Land Co., 410 U.S. at 728.
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landowners held much stronger interests than tenants or small landholders for
issues related to water allocation and reclamation.198 The Salyer opinion, based
in the Valley, minimized the intensity of the underlying political battle for
water and failed to acknowledge that in many rural western regions there are no
substitute sources of water: decisions at the local level can determine the life or
death of rural communities.199 The majority opinion additionally failed to
recognize that water distribution issues are heavily contested, even at the local
level, throughout the American West.
Salyer and Ball failed to grasp the complex ways in which water districts
function in western states. Reading the authorizing sections of the State Code
instead of the totality of policies codified in these statutes, the Court did not
account for the “crowding out” function of specialized water districts. Because
so many Valley water districts are quasi-public irrigation districts, their vast
geographic boundaries limit the territorial reaches of public water districts,
undermining public districts’ abilities to balance and negotiate the array of
demands for water.
3. Purely Private Governance
Within purely private governance schemes, water may be allocated,
bought, or distributed through private associations. Mutual water companies are
private companies composed for the purpose of water distribution.200 A
shareholder who invests in the services of a company owns the mutual water
company itself.201 Mutual water companies are not authorized to deliver water
to non-shareholders until after all shareholders receive their water orders.202
Water may also be distributed through private utility companies (PUCs), who
benefit from economies of scale but do not have the same degree of
vulnerability to State action as public utility agencies.
The most prevalent private water system in the Valley, the California
Water Service Company (CWSC), manages water within the southern tip of the
Valley, where water is especially scarce.203 One of the state’s largest private
water purveyors, CWSC sells water to public water districts, which then deliver
it to water users in their territories.204 Because private management systems are
treated as private corporations or associations, not as entities with a
responsibility to the public at large, these companies may sell water at high
prices to water-poor districts, which then pass along these costs to water users

198. Id. at 728–30.
199. Id. at 737–39 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
200. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2725 (Deering 2011).
201. Id.
202. Id. § 2728.
203. About Cal Water, supra note 150.
204. Your District, CAL. WATER SERV. CO., http://www.calwater.com/your_district/index.php
(last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
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in the form of higher rate payments.205 The primary goal of large private
systems, such as CWSC, is to maximize profit for their shareholders, not to
invest their water resources in initiatives with low or non-existent profit
margins.206 While this system may maximize economic welfare for private
associations themselves, their individual interests may cut against efforts to
maximize social welfare.
Finally, water may be delivered independently through private water
holdings, for example, if a person has a stream running through her property or
if she drills a private well. Under California’s clean water regimes, there are
few regulations regarding the water quality of groundwater.207 As a result,
private water use is almost completely unregulated for well users. Moreover,
neither state nor federal regimes govern water quality or set performance
standards for individual private wells, leaving thousands of rural residents in a
regulatory dead zone.208 Because the State does not place limits on groundwater
withdrawal, residential users and agricultural enterprises compete for the same
limited water sources. When groundwater resources are exhausted or fail to
recharge in time for individual use, rural residents are left without alternative
water sources.209
While these three typographies of local water governance—public, quasipublic, and pure private—provide an extremely diverse array of governance
models, their competing goals and methods of accountability continue to
present challenges in the delivery of clean, safe water to rural residents. The
result is a diverse, yet highly fractured, system of local management in which
low-income, rural communities are lost between the gaps of governance.
D. The Limits and Costs of Fragmented Water Governance
While at first glance California’s vast array of local water districts appears
to enhance local experimentation and choice of governance, the existence of
multiple overlapping and uncoordinated districts undermines effective
governance of the state’s aquifers. Instead, these districts limit residents’
political choices in two ways. First, the type of district residents may select for
drinking water and wastewater sanitation (sewage) limits their governance

205. Rick Holguin, Water District Ends Rationing Program, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2 1992, at A1;
Jerry Martin, Op-Ed, Round 2 in Rural Water Wars—YES: We Must Assure a Future Supply,
REPORTER (Vacaville, Cal.), Jan. 28, 2001; Ira E. Stoll, Water Agency Plans 3%-4% Rate Increase,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1995, at B1; Curtis S. Updike, Retailer Plans to Sell Water, DAILY NEWS L.A.
(Thousand Oaks ed.), Nov. 18, 1991, at 1.
206. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2701 (Deering 2011).
207. CAL. WATER CODE § 10750–10750.10 (Deering 2011) (limiting groundwater regulation
to the study of groundwater recharge and supplies). While the State theoretically retains a right to
govern groundwater supplies, it has not exercised this power. Id. §§ 104–105.
208. Definition of a Public Water System in SDWA Section 1401(4) as amended by the 1996
SDWA Amendments, 63 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Aug. 5, 1998).
209. Id.
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options, and residents’ ability to opt into a method of organization is
circumscribed by a variety of factors, including their access to funding, the preexistence of competing districts in the area, and the property interests of
landowners. Second, their choices are limited through the careful segregation of
water functions and subsequent political alienation of residents. By dividing the
many aspects of water access and management, even if communities were able
to access drinking water, they must compete with other neighboring water uses
to ensure that water remains available, sanitary, and sustainable. Auxiliary
water uses, such as irrigation, may have a significant impact on water availability, but non-landowning residents are prohibited from participating in decisions
governing the distribution of water to landholders. Further, residential landowners, by virtue of their small landholdings, cannot compete with the relative
weight of agricultural landowners within landowner-only voting schemes.
California’s complex system of local water management subordinates the
rights that county residents enjoy as citizens of the county to the rights that
municipal residents enjoy. By creating a tiered structure for local water
governments, the Water Code sets levels of citizenship, belonging, and
participation, and these relationships are directly connected to wealth and
power. By removing the ability of communities to seek redress and effectively
persuade local authorities, the State balances the burden of its environmentally
unfriendly agricultural policies on the backs of its most vulnerable
communities. Many of these communities, in turn, provide the labor required to
ensure the State’s agriculture economy succeeds. But the State has created a
system in which it is accountable to no one, and communities “off the grid”
must bear the disproportionate burden of infrastructure inequality on top of the
harms they already experience by virtue of their socioeconomic standing.
The complex partitioning of management across state agencies and local
water governments has created a water distribution, management, and
allocation structure that lacks transparency, accountability, and affordability.
Having let these structures grow without a global vision for water, there are few
avenues or channels for popular participation in decision making, water
planning, and resource allocation. California’s water governance system has
effectively enacted barriers to participation that have grown with its water
infrastructure itself. It has imposed code-made structures that do not allow for
traditional political participation and engagement around water governance.
Through its local water district design, the State has effectively transferred
rights away from citizens of unincorporated territories towards landholding and
city-dwelling residents. The right to drinking water is downgraded while the
demands of citizens with superior access to wealth or resources, by virtue of
their landholdings or residence/membership within a municipality, are given
primacy. In effect, citizens’ rights are amplified or minimized based on their
pre-existing power relationships within the region.

05-Pannu.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

1/17/2012 3:41 PM

DRINKING WATER AND EXCLUSION

261

The State’s decision to allocate political participation rights according to
land-holdings and wealth does not violate current local government
jurisprudence, but it fails to appropriately include all the state’s stakeholders in
discussions of water allocation. This failure undermines the State’s
constitutional and statutory policy objectives of ensuring that water is allocated
to the most beneficial uses and that every citizen is able to access safe, clean
drinking water. In its current formulation, safe and clean drinking water will
remain an unattainable policy goal without significant policy change.
IV.
PROPOSALS FOR MOVING BEYOND WATER INEQUALITY
California’s structural water governance woes need not create a permanent
barrier to achieving the right to clean and safe drinking water. By restructuring
its current water governance model, encouraging integrated water management,
providing suggested guidelines for ensuring clean drinking water, and funding
water projects in the most at-risk and vulnerable communities, the State has the
ability, and an obligation, to go beyond current inequalities and ensure access
to the most essential element of life for its millions of residents.
A. Consolidation
At the state and local level, California’s system of water governance is
deeply fractured. By consolidating water responsibilities—from long-term
planning, infrastructure, water allocation, reclamation, quality and
contamination, monitoring, and enforcement—into a single agency, the State
has the opportunity to concentrate expertise and address the full range of water
policy concerns.
Local government scholars disagree on whether fragmentation, and by
contrast, consolidation, result in better administration or management of
resources.210 In the contexts of natural resources and environmental policy,
210. For example, Megan Mullin has indicated that fragmentation itself cannot account for
water scarcity or water management failures within urban water districts. MEGAN MULLIN,
GOVERNING THE TAP: SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW LOCAL POLITICS OF WATER
177–78 (2009). She argues that specialization provides a net benefit that integrated water districts
could not provide. Id. at 178, 182–85. Conversely, Christopher Berry has argued that specialization
may frustrate efforts at integrated management. CHRISTOPHER R. BERRY, IMPERFECT UNION:
REPRESENTATION AND TAXATION IN MULTILEVEL GOVERNMENTS 129–47 (2009). Rick Schragger
has argued that decentralization does not always provide better coordination or services in the context
of urban economic development. Richard C. Schragger, Decentralization and Development, 96 VA. L.
REV. 1837, 1893–97, 1901–06 (2010).
The literature on fragmentation and consolidation within administrative law is also helpful,
although it may not translate to local water governments. See Eric Biber, Too Many Things to Do:
How to Deal with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-Goal Agencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2009);
William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA
L. REV. 1 (2003); Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
1655 (2006).
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scholars are divided as to what level of consolidation or fragmentation would
result in optimal resource management and coordination.211 Similarly,
determining an appropriate level of consolidation at both the state and local
levels would require balancing the need for better oversight with ensuring
greater public transparency, accountability, and participation.
Currently, the State has charged the California Department of Water
Resources with the responsibility of drafting and updating a State Water Plan
every five years.212 Until 2009, this report did not incorporate planning input or
information from other state agencies.213 While the report takes stock of water
flows and aquifer recharge, it does not offer clear policy prescriptions or goals
for water management and distributional equity. Instead, the Water Plan
focuses on sharing information with local water managers regarding watermaximizing technologies; it does not offer pathways for achieving integrated
statewide water planning.
Instead of relying on inter-agency cooperation to ensure a comprehensive
water plan, consolidation would allow the State to charge a single department
or agency with the responsibility of identifying California’s water policy
priorities and targets, as well as with providing the technical support and data
necessary for water system organizers to make informed decisions over
conservation, reclamation, allocation, and sanitation. In effect, consolidation
would create space for the State to mobilize its resources and research to ensure
clear guidance and provide comprehensive water policy options.
Given the State’s persistent financial woes, consolidation would also
allow the State to maximize its limited resources while also better protecting
the public interest. Instead of financing the full apparatus of competing
agencies, consolidation could allow information sharing across agencies,
decrease the practical fixed costs of funding ten different offices, and could
create a central clearinghouse for information. Further, consolidation could
help ensure agencies are sufficiently staffed, allowing them to better serve the
public. For example, California’s State Water Resources Control Board
(SWRCB), the primary enforcement agent for water violations, is shamefully
understaffed and unable to achieve consistent protection of its own agency

211. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, CALFED and the Quest for Optimal Institutional
Fragmentation, 12 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 729, 729–30 (2009) (evaluating management in the context
of CALFED); Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and Ends of Natural Resources
Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1417–23 (2011) (applying principles of natural resources law and
management to climate change). But see Alejandro E. Camacho, Adapting Governance to Climate
Change: Managing Uncertainty Through a Learning Infrastructure, 59 EMORY L.J. 1, 26–29 (2009).
212. California Water Plan, CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov
(last visited Oct. 22, 2011).
213. CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE 2009—HIGHLIGHTS 12
(2009), available at http://www.waterplan.water.ca.gov/docs/cwpu2009/0310final/highlights_
cwp2009_spread.pdf.
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goals.214 Instead of segregating specialists across different agencies, a single
agency would benefit from allowing different forms of expertise to crosspollinate within a single “home.” This would allow for more thoughtful, and
perhaps more comprehensive, water policy and management, and it would also
decrease staff needs across agencies by aggregating all staff expertise under
one roof (as opposed to requiring each agency to hire a full staff of scientists,
lawyers, engineers, etc.). Instead of battling and competing for dominance for
disparate policy goals, these goals would be managed and balanced within a
single entity.
Furthermore, consolidation would also allow for a single, accountable
agent. Instead of citizens and decision makers falling into a black hole of water
governance, residents would be able to demand accountability from a
consolidated state water agency. This would better allow for public
participation and feedback, and citizens would know to expect water policies,
regulations, and hearings to be supervised by a single state entity.
Going beyond consolidation, citizens of the state should also consider
creating and electing an independent executive water officer. Similar to the
state superintendent for public instruction, the state water commissioner would
serve as a nonpartisan and independent executive officer charged with
effectuating the State’s water policies. Bringing water management into the
public election cycle would also bring water policy out of the shadows of the
California legislature, allowing greater transparency and participation among
members of the general public. Despite fears of populist retaliation or water
grabs, voters have passed visionary water initiatives in the past, and it is likely
that their understanding of the limitations of water scarcity would inform an
electoral process both at the sate and local level.
The creation of a state water commissioner position would also allow the
State to adopt a more forward-thinking approach to water policy; instead of
waiting for water disasters (drought, infrastructure failure, increased demand),
candidates would be expected to provide an integrated vision for California
water during each elections cycle. While an electoral model still runs the risk of
coastal dominance in the elections cycle, it has a much stronger chance of
allowing rural regions of the state a direct voice, and a direct method of
petition, in water policymaking.

214. It is important to note that gross understaffing is no fault of the SWRCB; the Board has
been consistently underfunded by the State, and throughout California’s current multi-year budget
crisis the SWRCB has faced deep cuts that have placed it on a survivalist budget. Loretta Kalb, State
Water Quality Board Wants to Cut Back on Inspections, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 18, 2010, at A1;
Kate Campbell, CA Governor: Taxes, Cuts and Agriculture, NAT. RES. REP. (Jan. 21, 2011),
http://naturalresourcereport.com/2011/01/ca-governor-taxes-cuts-and-agriculture; see also Kate
Campbell, State Budget Gap Totals $19 Billion; Cuts, Fees Planned, AGALERT (May 19, 2010),
http://www.agalert.com/story/?id=1542 (detailing the impact of the State’s budgetary crisis on the
Water Resources Control Board).

05-Pannu.docx (Do Not Delete)

264

1/17/2012 3:41 PM

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100:223

However, consolidation is not a panacea for California’s structural water
management challenges. While proponents of state-enforced rights often see
consolidation as a preferred method of organization, agencies that are too big—
either in scope or in geographic coverage—run the risk of becoming
unresponsive and inaccessible to the public. A single state water agency could
be a one-stop clearinghouse, or it could be an impenetrable regulatory force,
internalizing California’s complex water management system and rendering
this system less transparent and less cogent to the public at large.
B. Regional Integration and Representation
Following agency consolidation, the State should consider restructuring
its current panoply of local water districts to create regionally integrated water
boards. Instead of battling over the same water resources, these integrated
water boards would have the ability to track the geography of hydrological
basins, and they would be able to transcend the somewhat arbitrary borders of
counties. Further, integrated boards would displace current quasi-public boards,
creating unified and public local water governments throughout the state. Board
elections would be open to all water users within its territorial bounds,
embracing the “one person, one vote” principle and bolstering accountability
across diverse water uses and users.215
A regional model would help the State maintain its value for local
experimentation and responsiveness, and it would also allow regions to create a
holistic vision of water management. Marshaling their collective expertise,
local water districts would not have to recreate data or remap the contours of
their regions. Instead, they could offer comprehensive data on local hydrology,
on the array of water users and uses, and on water infrastructure needs. They
could also levy rates and costs more equitably, issuing taxes or fees for specific
water uses instead of allocating costs by geographic region (regardless of an
individual user’s water uses). This model may also provide room for the
creation of “lifeline rates”216 for residential water use, allowing a regional
board to offer more thoughtful price points based on quantifiable use levels.
Integrated boards would retain their tax-exempt status, as well as their
powers of eminent domain, bonding, taxation, and enforcement. Most
importantly, they would retain the responsibility to consider the full array of
local water issues—from flood management and reclamation to irrigation,

215. While Salyer and Ball hold that land-based voting schemes are constitutional in the
context of special-purpose districts, they do not require land-based voting schemes. The California
legislature, and similarly state legislatures throughout the country, have the power to amend their
special district statutes to require a “one person, one vote” voting scheme.
216. Lifeline rates are often utilized to provide differential pricing for low-income or
economically vulnerable utility users. Rates may be set by consumption levels or by socioeconomic
factors. See Affordability Considerations, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, http://water.epa.gov/
infrastructure/sustain/affordability.cfm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).

05-Pannu.docx (Do Not Delete)

2012]

1/17/2012 3:41 PM

DRINKING WATER AND EXCLUSION

265

wastewater and residential use—within a single, locally responsive entity. By
providing residents the opportunity to vote, and to vote with parity, integrated
water boards ensure that public resources are leveraged for public initiatives
instead of being held captive by powerful corporate interests.
While integrated boards are prone to capture, they are less likely to
overweight the interests of the most financially powerful when compared to
landownership-based voting schemes or schemes that prioritize municipal
government over alternative methods of local organization.217 Further, the State
can prioritize geographic, socioeconomic, and residential diversity in its
regional boards. Similar to its requirements for representation on Local Agency
Formation Commissions (LAFCOs), the State could require regional
representation from small water system users, from unincorporated users, from
urban users, and from local governments.218 It could ensure representation from
certain localities, and it could also prioritize and ensure significant rural
representation on its boards. Designated seats within a regional board would
provide a dramatic representational improvement over current models where
there are no guarantees for unincorporated rural representation on public or
quasi-public water district boards.
C. Enhancing Statutory Protections
Throughout the 2009–2010 legislative session, the California legislature
considered and passed what it later referred to as the Omnibus Water Bill of
2009.219 Among these bills was the California Human Right to Water Bill,
which proposed codifying the prioritization of domestic water as the most
important water use and providing directives and enforcement hooks to state
agencies to ensure and effectuate the human right to clean, affordable, and
accessible domestic water for all Californians.220 In his veto message, the
Governor argued that the bill was redundant and that the failure to ensure safe,
accessible, and affordable domestic water was a matter of financial concern,
not a failure of legal coverage.221 The Governor issued this statement at the
217. See generally KAY LEHMAN SHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1996) (explaining the role of organized interests in subverting the
democratic process); THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed., 1980) (explaining the role
of regulated industries in reshaping agency behavior away from the public interest and towards
particular special interests).
218. The legislature chartered the creation of local agency formation commissions (LAFCOs)
to assist in managing urban sprawl. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 56300–56301 (Deering 2011). Among their
powers, LAFCOs may review, approve, or disapprove the establishment of any local government
districts within their formal boundaries or “spheres of influence.” Id. §§ 56375–56388. In an attempt to
balance the demands of pre-existing local governments within the region, LAFCOs are required to
include representatives from the county, cities within the county, members of independent special
districts, and a member of the general public. Id. §§ 56325–56337.
219. SPECIAL SESSION POLICY BILLS AND BOND SUMMARY, supra note 19.
220. Assemb. B. 1242, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
221. Governor’s Veto Message, Assemb. B. 1242, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009),
AND
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same time that he authorized over five billion dollars in water infrastructure
projects222 unrelated to projects that would vindicate or support California’s
“well-established”223 priority for pure, safe, drinking water and domestic water.
Ensuring access to affordable water is more than a question of political
will; it also requires addressing how California’s water governance system
results in structural inequality in the management and distribution of the state’s
water resources. While California provides an affirmative right to “pure and
safe” drinking water,224 the State has not taken a similarly affirmative step
toward bridging the water governance gap for rural residents.
Beginning with the re-adoption of the Human Right to Water Bill, the
legislature should consider expanding its provisions for enforcing and ensuring
California’s right to pure, safe, and affordable domestic and drinking water.
While the final version of the Human Right to Water Bill redacted provisions
ensuring high-quality water “regardless of individual economic
circumstances,”225 the legislature should consider reintroducing these measures
and earmarking greater funding to ensure the delivery of affordable, safe,
accessible water.226 While the Human Right to Water Bill exempted the State
from investing in water infrastructure to achieve its stated right to clean,
affordable, and accessible drinking water,227 California should invest in
significant infrastructure improvements for residential water supplies, particularly for communities already exposed to out-of-compliance water systems.
D. Funding Rural Drinking Water Infrastructure
Both California and the federal government have invested heavily in the
development of monolithic water infrastructure projects, ranging from the
creation of the Governor Edmund G. Brown California Aqueduct to the
complex system of canals and dams built on the Colorado, Owens, and San
Joaquin Rivers.228 A great deal of California’s infrastructure efforts have
available at ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/09-10/bill/asm/ab_1201-1250/ab_1242_cfa_20100917_
162710_asm_floor.html; California Right to Water Bill Vetoed, supra note 19.
222. See SPECIAL SESSION POLICY BILLS AND BOND SUMMARY, supra note 19; Boxall, supra
note 19; Steinhauer, supra note 19; California Right to Water Bill Vetoed, supra note 19.
223. Governor’s Veto Message, Assemb. B. 1242.
224. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 116270(a) (Deering 2011).
225. Assemb. B. 1242, 2009–2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009).
226. Under Governor Brown’s tenure, California has adopted several bills to begin to address
the deficits in rural drinking water access, but additional action will be necessary to bridge the resource
gap for rural water systems located in unincorporated communities. Assemb. B. 54, 938, 983, 1194,
1221, 1292, 2010–2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011); S.B. 244, 2010–2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2011); Russell Clemings, Gov. Brown Signs Clean-Water Bills: Laws Come on Heels of Plan to
Improve Small Water Systems, FRESNO BEE (Oct. 8, 2011), http://www.fresnobee.com/2011/10/07/
2568202/brown-signs-clean-water-bills.html.
227. Assemb. B. 1242, § 1(c) (“This section does not expand any obligation of the state to
provide water or to require the expenditure of additional resources to develop water infrastructure
beyond the obligations that may exist pursuant to subdivision (b).”).
228. HUNDLEY, supra note 16, at 123–71 (Los Angeles Project), 234–75 (Central Valley
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focused on ensuring water for the cities of San Francisco and Los Angeles, as
well as irrigating the arid Central Valley for agricultural production.229
Nonetheless, for rural residential water users, the State has done very little to
support water infrastructure.
As mentioned previously, many unincorporated rural communities face
significant socioeconomic hardships relative to their assets, and they lack the
resources to improve or create water infrastructure without significant
investment from the State. In 2009, the State authorized $181,971,000 in bonds
for implementation and planning grants for “integrated regional water
management” through the California Department of Water Resources.230 Only
ten percent of these funds, or eighteen million dollars, must be set aside for
meeting the “critical water supply needs of disadvantaged communities.”231
While this figure may seem impressive, it hardly begins to bridge the gap
between the crucial need facing rural small water system users and the funding
needed to improve domestic water infrastructure in these regions. Between
planning and construction, most small systems communities estimate the cost
of upgrading their infrastructure to meet public health requirements at $250–
500,000 per system.232 With over 450 small water systems in the most
vulnerable and disadvantaged rural communities, the State has allocated only
enough funding to support improvements in approximately forty to fifty of
these communities.233
Further, the State missed a crucial opportunity to bridge the water equity
gap. When issuing instructions to the California Department of Water
Resources, it could have required that all of its grant funding be allocated to
applicants showing measurable, achievable, and aggressive initiatives and
could have provided suggestions for meeting water needs in regional and local
vulnerable and disadvantaged communities. In exchange for State contributions
to water infrastructure, large cities have limited their water use in an effort to
support statewide conservation efforts.234 Similarly, by investing in water
Project).
229. Id.
230. A.B. 626, ch. 367, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009) (integrated regional water
management grants).
231. Id.
232. Roger Beck et al., Benchmark Investigation of Small Water System Economics:
Discussion and Preliminary Findings 2 (2001) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); see also
CLAUDIA COPELAND & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31116, WATER
INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS AND INVESTMENT: REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES 19 (2010)
(explaining that even current federal programs designed to serve small systems are inadequately
designed to address the challenges of rural residents).
233. It should be noted that the figure of 450 small water systems likely underestimates the true
number of vulnerable and disadvantaged water-using communities. For example, this initial survey
focused on the central San Joaquin Valley (not the greater Valley), and it does not include water
systems on tribal lands.
234. CAL. WATER CODE § 12929–12929.46 (Deering 2011); JOHN HART, STORM OVER
MONO: THE MONO LAKE BATTLE AND THE CALIFORNIA WATER FUTURE 132–33 (1996) (detailing a
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infrastructure for rural residential water use, the State could ameliorate a dire
human rights concern while also experimenting in conservation-friendly
policies and water technologies.
While the cost of upgrading water infrastructure for vulnerable
communities is steep, it pales in comparison to State investments in non-healthrelated water infrastructure.235 Further, when these costs are compared to the
State’s long-term losses (in the form of lost work days, health costs, and lost
disposable income) and residents’ private expenditures, infrastructure
investment would be a much more cost-effective and prudent investment for
the long-term survival and health of rural communities and, by extension, the
state at large.
Finally, through its decades-long entanglement in water resources
management, the State of California has formed an ethical obligation to ensure
that all its residents have access to safe, affordable drinking water. While there
are compelling policy rationales for pursuing a more equitable system of water
allocation, ultimately the vast human rights concerns facing California’s most
impoverished and at-risk communities should serve as the primary motivation
for addressing the state’s quagmire of water governance. In evaluating the
history of these communities and extent to which they are politically and
geographically marginalized, the State may serve a crucial role in addressing
the needs of these communities when their own local governments will not.
CONCLUSION
California’s fractured and limited system of water governance widens the
gap between the State’s statutory goals for drinking water and the realities of
water inequality for vulnerable rural residents. While water policy is uniquely
complex in the American West, these policies need not fall into the same rote
arguments over water scarcity, conservation, and development. Instead, both
California and other western states have an unprecedented opportunity to
pursue innovative methods of addressing their water woes. As climate change
and population growth place increasing burdens on the West’s finite water
supply, addressing the long-term future of water use will be essential to
averting conflict. Most importantly, policy makers must prioritize water equity
in their public debates and discussions, particularly for the state’s most
vulnerable and at-risk communities. Prioritizing equity is not only necessary for
ensuring thoughtful local water stewardship; it is also necessary to ensure the
State truly protects the public health interests of all its residents, not only its
most visible, most concentrated, or most affluent.

compact between the State and the City of Los Angeles exchanging millions of dollars in water
infrastructure funding for decreasing the City's extraction and use of waters from Mono Lake).
235. See generally HUNDLEY, supra note 16, at 121–365 (describing the billions of federal
dollars directed towards non-health-related water infrastructure development throughout California).

